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NADAV SHOKED
The past decade has witnessed an unprecedented expansion in the 
number and reach of local excise taxes. Though excise taxes have 
always formed part of the American fiscal system, they have 
traditionally been largely state, or even federal, level taxes. Therefore, 
contemporary excise taxes that have received much attention—soda 
taxes, plastic bag taxes, gun taxes, and more—are innovative not only 
in the products they target, but also in the identity of the government 
imposing them: a city or county government. From a legal perspective, 
the most striking—and heretofore, largely unacknowledged—feature of 
this development is the wholehearted legal embrace of this turn to the 
local. This Article demonstrates that when confronting the new local 
excise taxes, courts have completely reversed their typically hostile 
attitude towards local action. Usually courts insist that a locality 
identify a source of authority for any act it adopts. But when the 
contested local act is an excise tax, courts will only strike it down if an 
explicit state preempting law is shown—and, when present, they will 
interpret such a law narrowly. This result is achieved through the 
manipulation of a series of doctrines that are at play when local excise 
taxes are challenged, including doctrines pertaining to the 
interpretation of enabling acts, to home rule initiative powers, to 
implied preemption, to home rule immunity powers, to uniformity in 
taxation clauses, and more. The justifications courts provide for these 
moves draw on a formalistic, and rather unpersuasive, distinction 
between taxation and regulation. Still, this Article argues that courts’
resultant permissive attitude towards local excise taxation is 
worthwhile for other, substantive, reasons: local decision-making in 
this specific field promotes the political and economic normative values 
normally ascribed to localism.
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I. INTRODUCTION
For almost a decade now, the defining characteristic of the state–local 
relationship has been the reassertion of state supremacy. Owing to the widening 
divide between the nation’s politically progressive big cities and the much more 
conservative politicians controlling many state capitols, the power of local 
governments to initiate policies—innovative policies but also traditional ones—
has been harshly curtailed. Most blatantly, state legislative preemption of local 
ordinances has grown much more pervasive—and significantly more 
aggressive. In a series of recent articles, some of the most prominent scholars of 
local government law have investigated this contemporary unbalancing of the 
state–local relationship.1 These authors stress the threat these new practices pose 
to the standing of local governments and, consequently, to the normative value 
attributed to localism in the American scheme of government.
Yet, at the same time that their policymaking powers have generally been 
under attack, local governments’ presence in one highly conspicuous field has 
actually grown dramatically more pronounced. Excise taxation is now, more 
than ever before, a sphere where local governments are hectically active. Plastic 
bags, soda, guns, high salaries, marijuana, large employee counts,2 and in one 
                                                                                                                     
1 See generally Richard Briffault, The Challenge of the New Preemption, 70 STAN. L.
REV. 1995 (2018) (discussing the emergence and rapid spread of novel, and particularly 
harsh, forms of state preemption of local government action); Nestor Davidson, The 
Dilemma of Localism in an Era of Polarization, 128 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2019) (arguing 
that the recent surge in state preemption requires the development of a more principled 
approach to the vertical allocation of authority between the state and the city); Richard C. 
Schragger, The Attack on American Cities, 96 TEX. L. REV. 1163 (2018) (discussing the 
attack by state legislatures on municipal ordinances).
2 See infra Part II.A.
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proposal, human-replacing robots,3 have all become targets for special, new, 
municipal taxes. Most striking from a legal perspective has been the fact, 
heretofore largely ignored by commentators, that courts throughout the land 
have, almost unanimously, tended to embrace this form of local action—even 
when faced with contradictory state-level legislative dictates.4
The turn to local excise taxes thus not only bucks the current political 
dynamic in the local–state relationship; it also unsettles the traditional legal 
attitude towards cities’ standing in that relationship. Ever since the nineteenth 
century, the dominant theme in the judicial regulation of the state–local 
relationship has been an overall preference for consolidation of power on the 
state level. Federal and state courts famously refer to the city as a “creature” of 
the state.5 Accordingly, they tend to adopt in most cases a restrictive approach, 
insisting that local governments pinpoint a state authorization for each and every 
one of their actions and interpreting such authorizations narrowly.6 Even 
legislative and constitutional reforms adopted to overrule this approach have, 
more often than not, confronted judicial intransigence and have, as a result, 
largely failed to dislodge anti-city legal attitudes. The recent legislative attacks 
on cities are arguably unprecedented in their ferocity, but courts have, 
throughout our modern legal history, paved the way for them and handicapped 
cities’ ability to resist. Much of local government scholarship—in law, but also 
in economics, political science, sociology, and philosophy—is a lament about 
this modern legal attitude and a call for reforms that would unleash city power 
and chip away at the state’s supremacy.7
Local excise taxation, as this Article will show, is a field in which courts 
have actually heeded this call to nurture municipal action. They have endorsed 
cities’ moves to adopt new excise taxation schemes.8 Indeed, they have actively 
incentivized local governments to turn to excise taxation. Without stating so 
explicitly, and through the manipulation of diverse doctrines, courts have 
                                                                                                                     
3 Emily Price, Bill Gates’ Plan to Tax Robots Could Become a Reality in San 
Francisco, FORTUNE (Sept. 5, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/09/05/san-francisco-robot-tax/
[https://perma.cc/PF4Q-68C3].
4 See infra Part III.
5 See, e.g., New Orleans v. Clark, 95 U.S. 644, 654 (1877); Comm’rs of Laramie Cty. 
v. Comm’rs of Albany Cty., 92 U.S. 307, 308 (1875); W. Saving Fund Soc’y v. City of 
Philadelphia, 31 Pa. 175, 182 (Pa. 1858) (“[A] municipal corporation . . . may be created and 
destroyed by the state at pleasure”). The attitude is most famously associated with the 
decision in Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178–79 (1907), where the Supreme 
Court refused to entertain a challenge by residents to a state’s decision to disband their city 
and annex it to another.
6 See, e.g., Hunter, 207 U.S. at 178–79; Clark, 95 U.S. at 654.
7 E.g., HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 283 (1963); GERALD E. FRUG, CITY 
MAKING: BUILDING COMMUNITIES WITHOUT BUILDING WALLS 8–9 (1999); RICHARD 
SCHRAGGER, CITY POWER: URBAN GOVERNANCE IN A GLOBAL AGE 15–17 (2016); RICHARD 
SENNETT, THE USES OF DISORDER: PERSONAL IDENTITY & CITY LIFE 190–94 (1970); Robert 
A. Dahl, The City in the Future of Democracy, 61 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 953, 967 (1967).
8 See infra Part III.
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adopted an approach for local excise taxes that reverses the traditional, state-
centric, legal test for local action (and for other, non excise-based, forms of local 
taxation).9 When a city resorts to excise taxes, rather than require that it identify 
explicit state authorization for its action (as is common elsewhere), courts 
require that the challenging state identify an unambiguous state-level 
prohibition on the city’s action.10 Courts, that is, refuse to independently 
interpose on behalf of the state, forcing the state legislature to take active 
legislative steps to stop the local excise tax. They thereby greatly expand the 
grounds for local action.11
The permissive attitude towards excise taxation revealed in this Article is 
particularly intriguing since excise taxes combine fiscal powers with regulatory 
ones. As fiscal measures, these taxes represent a vehicle for local governments 
to expand their revenue base at a time when many American cities are 
confronted with mounting financial distress. Financial struggles are a defining 
element of contemporary American localism.12 Over the past half-decade, 
Detroit entered bankruptcy;13 Chicago’s bonds were downgraded to junk 
grade;14 and many local governments have been contending with pension 
liabilities universally deemed unsustainable.15 The need to replenish local 
coffers is thus acute. The law further compounds the problem since local 
governments are severely hampered in their legal ability to address their 
pecuniary need. State supremacy in American law has largely been established 
through the undermining of local financial independence.16 States strictly limit 
                                                                                                                     
9 See infra Part III.
10 See infra Part III.
11 A recent, and valuable, article implored courts to adopt this approach to local 
taxation. Erin Adele Scharff, Powerful Cities? Limits on Municipal Taxing Authority and 
What to Do About Them, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 292, 334 (2016). Since that article mostly does 
not distinguish excise taxes from other municipal taxes, it cannot note the fact—to be 
established here—that courts have actually been acting in this fashion, with respect to that 
one group of taxes.
12 For a comprehensive account of cities in fiscal distress and the reasons leading to 
that distress, see Michelle Wilde Anderson, The New Minimal Cities, 123 YALE L.J. 1118, 
1130–51 (2014).
13 See In re City of Detroit, No. 13-53846, 2013 WL 4761053, at *1 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 
2013).
14 In May 2015, the rating agency Moody’s dropped Chicago’s debt to “junk bond”
status. See Aaron Kuriloff, Moody’s Cuts Chicago’s Debt to Junk: Ratings Firm Drops 
City’s Debt Two Notches to BA1 from BAA2, WALL ST. J. (May 12, 2015), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/moodys-cuts-chicagos-debt-to-junk-1431470944 
[https://perma.cc/K3DC-PSG7].
15 See Alexis Stephens, Which Cities Should Be Most Worried About Pension Funds?,
NEXT CITY (Sept. 3, 2014), http://nextcity.org/daily/entry/cities-pension-funds-worries 
[https://perma.cc/RJ3R-VHCX] (discussing municipal pension-funding shortfalls and 
responses).
16 Nadav Shoked & Daniel Rodriguez, Financing Local Governments in Times of 
Recession: Financial and Legal Innovation in the Face of the 2008 Crisis, in THE LEGAL 
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cities’ ability to raise debt17 and enter bankruptcy;18 they closely regulate local 
taxation powers and taxing practices;19 they mostly render the most important 
tax on which governments, such as the state itself, rely—the income tax—
legally unavailable to American localities;20 and finally, over the past forty 
years, state constitutions and laws have increasingly limited property taxes, 
cities’ chief form of taxation.21 With many other financial avenues thereby 
curtailed, the judicial move to throw wide-open the doors for local excise 
taxation is bound to substantially impact local fiscal behavior. 
The legal approach toward local excise taxes is noteworthy not solely due 
to such actual and potential fiscal effects. Excise taxation is a special form of 
taxation. These are taxes that carry an explicitly regulatory component. All 
taxes, naturally, represent a form of regulation: altering activities’ costs 
inevitably affects market choices. Excise taxes are perhaps the most extreme 
illustration of this fact; they single out specific goods, say alcohol or tobacco, 
and render them more expensive to consume. They, in other words, decrease 
those goods’ availability. Empowering cities to engage in excise taxation thus 
empowers them to engage in the regulation of individual behavior whose 
policing might otherwise be reserved to the state. 
The practical importance of this shift in the city–state relationship might 
extend still further in our current age of political polarization between cities and 
their host states. Excise taxes are a potent tool in the hands of cities seeking to 
pursue, or to make a statement regarding, social and economic goals, 
particularly those that are hotly contested. They enable cities whose population 
is of one political persuasion to defy the preferences of their larger home state 
where the majority of the population may be of the other persuasion. Many local 
excise taxes have, therefore, been driven by certain cities’ beliefs regarding 
controversial environmental, cultural, and health concerns—beliefs not shared 
with their state’s leadership.22
                                                                                                                     
POWER OF CITIES: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES IN URBAN LAW (Nestor Davidson ed., forthcoming 
2018).
17 See Nadav Shoked, Debt Limits’ End, 102 IOWA L. REV. 1239, 1251–52 (2017).
18 See Anderson, supra note 12, at 1152.
19 See, e.g., LA. CONST. art. VI, § 29 (limiting a local government’s use taxes and sales, 
taxes to 3% unless a higher rate is authorized by the state legislature and approved by a 
majority of local voters); MO. CONST. art. X, § 22 (requiring that increases in local taxes be 
subject to voter approval and banning them from exceeding any increase in the consumer 
price index for all urban consumers); LA. STAT. ANN. § 33:2711 (2002) (limiting local sales 
taxes); N.Y. TAX LAW § 1201(a) (McKinley 2017) (restricting local sales taxes).
20 See NAT’L LEAGUE OF CITIES, Cities and State Fiscal Structure 16 tbl.1A (2015),
http://www.nlc.org/Documents/Find%20City%20Solutions/Research%20Innovation/Finan
ce/NLC_CSFS_Report_WEB.PDF [https://perma.cc/3225-TU57] (summarizing available 
municipal taxing authority).
21 See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. XIII A, § 1(a) (limiting local real estate tax levels); N.Y.
CONST. art. VIII, § 10 (same); IDAHO CODE § 63-1313(1)(a) (2015) (same); LA. STAT. ANN.
§ 33:2711 (limiting local sales taxes).
22 See infra Part II.B.
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The new local excise taxes therefore cry out for attention. As an important 
and expanding policy tool for local revenue-raising and regulation, their legal 
standing ought to be described and analyzed. As a deviation from the regular 
patterns of the legal policing of the state–local relationship, at a time when that 
relationship is particularly strained, the legal standing of local excise taxes 
offers a convenient vehicle for normatively assessing the position of local 
governments in the local–state interface.
To fulfill these tasks—descriptive and normative—this Article proceeds as 
follows. Part II provides a brief overview of current city practices respecting 
excise taxes. It lists the goods and activities that cities have been recently 
subjecting to excise taxation, and the motivations that breed such taxes. Part III 
presents the legal framework within which these taxes are adopted, by 
summarizing the litigation that has surrounded local excise taxes. It concludes 
that, in tandem, courts’ decisions under the different doctrinal headings used to 
attack local excise taxes unsettle the traditional formula for balancing state and 
city powers—in favor of local action. Part IV normatively assesses this mode of 
resolving the state–local battle over excise taxation. It finds that, in light of the 
rationales for excise taxation identified in Part II, the reasoning courts provide 
for their permissive approach toward local excise taxation outlined in Part III is 
unpersuasive. Still, Part IV argues that normatively this judicial attitude is 
desirable, since local excise taxation—while not categorically different from 
other forms of local regulation as courts contend—tends to serve the goals 
normally associated with localism without raising the concerns that usually 
justify the wielding of state authority to restrain local regulation.
II. LOCAL EXCISE TAXATION
A. The New Local Excise Taxes
Excise taxes are an amount of money paid to the government whenever a 
specific good is purchased, or when a specific activity is engaged in.23 As such, 
these taxes are a variant of the sales tax—a duty imposed on purchases. Unlike 
normal sales taxes, which are general and apply to all goods (often with some 
exceptions), excise taxes are a special, additional tax imposed only on the sale 
of certain products. The earliest, and longest-running, excise taxes are those 
imposed on alcohol and tobacco.24 Fuel (gas and diesel) taxes are another 
                                                                                                                     
23 Excise Tax, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-
businesses-self-employed/excise-tax [https://perma.cc/LKJ9-8GTC] (last updated Apr. 13, 
2018).
24 A federal alcohol tax was adopted as early as 1791 (inciting the Whiskey Rebellion). 
TUN YUAN HU, THE LIQUOR TAX IN THE UNITED STATES, 1791–1947, at 19–33 (1950). The 
tax was abolished in 1802 and reintroduced during the war of 1812. Id. at 33. It was then 
imposed on a long-term basis during the Civil War. During the early 19th century, the federal 
government had, at times, an excise tax applied to tobacco. SUSAN WAGNER, CIGARETTE 
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instance of excise taxation with which most individuals are acquainted. These
examples highlight the extent to which excise taxes have always been a part of 
the American fiscal state. They also highlight a key legal attribute about excise 
taxes in the American fiscal system: by and large, excise taxes—unlike other 
taxes imposed on goods, such as property or sales taxes—have primarily been 
state, or even federal, taxes.25
Recently, however, a noticeable trend has emerged: local governments have 
entered the field of excise taxation much more forcibly than ever before. In so 
doing, they have not only expanded the number of governments engaged in 
excise taxation in America, but also expanded the number of goods and services 
subject to excise taxation in America. While cigarettes, the traditional target for 
any excise tax, might also be the earliest example for a local excise tax (six 
hundred local governments still have cigarette excise taxes),26 local 
governments now tax an array of other products, enlarging the sphere of goods 
subject to excise taxation well beyond its historical domain.
Several examples for the products that have become the most popular 
targets for local excise taxation can illustrate this phenomenon. In 2005, San
Francisco was the first city to propose an excise tax on plastic shopping bags, 
and though the legislative effort there fizzled,27 dozens, if not hundreds, of local 
governments now impose such taxes on plastic or paper bags.28 In addition, 
since 2008, Chicago has been imposing a separate tax on bottled water.29 Across 
the Bay from San Francisco, Berkeley became the first local government to 
impose an excise tax on sugar-sweetened beverages in 2014.30 Since January 
                                                                                                                     
COUNTRY: TOBACCO IN AMERICAN HISTORY AND POLITICS 119 (1971). The Civil War made 
such taxes both more substantial and permanent. Id.
25 On the early taxes being federal, see discussion in supra note 24. In 1921, Iowa 
became the first state to tax tobacco. WAGNER, supra note 24, at 119. North Carolina was 
the last state to tax cigarettes when it added a two cent tax per cigarette pack in 1969. 
INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE (US) COMMITTEE ON PREVENTING NICOTINE ADDICTION IN 
CHILDREN AND YOUTHS, GROWING UP TOBACCO FREE: PREVENTING NICOTINE ADDICTION 
IN CHILDREN AND YOUTHS 178 (Barbara S. Lynch & Richard J. Bonnie eds., 1994), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK236771/#ddd00127 [https://perma.cc/3RHE-
8A6M].
26 See Ann Boonn, Local Government Cigarette Tax Rates & Fees, CAMPAIGN FOR 
TOBACCO-FREE KIDS (June 25, 2018), https://www.tobaccofreekids.org/assets/factsheets/
0304.pdf [https://perma.cc/3JF6-G94T].
27 Andy Keller, History of the Plastic Bag (Updated 11/2016), BAGMONSTER (Nov. 11, 
2016, 12:00 AM), https://www.bagmonster.com/2016/11/history-of-the-plastic-bag.html
[https://perma.cc/N7V2-DGMB].
28 Even when an ordinance aims to ban plastic bags, to be effective, it must include a 
tax on paper bags, for otherwise consumers are unlikely to turn to reusable bags. Plastic Bag 
Bans and Fees, SURFRIDER FOUND., http://www.surfrider.org/pages/plastic-bag-bans-fees 
[https://perma.cc/J4VT-7HRE].
29 See CHI., ILL. MUN. CODE § 3-43-030 (2008) (the rate is $0.05 per bottle of water).
30 See Vauhini Vara, There’s Now a Soda Tax in Philadelphia, but Not Because Sugar 
Is Bad for You, NEW YORKER (June 16, 2016), https://www.newyorker.com/business/curr
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2017, Philadelphia is the largest city in the country with such a tax,31 a title it 
had to forego for a few brief months during the summer of 2017 when Cook 
County, Illinois, had the tax (the Cook County tax was repealed in October 
2017—as will be discussed in Part IV).32 Cook County still enforces, ever since 
2013, a tax on the sale of firearms,33 which was also adopted in 2015 by Seattle 
where it also applies to the sale of ammunition34 (Los Angeles considered 
replicating that model).35 In states, such as California and Colorado, where the 
sale of marijuana has been legalized, many cities have proceeded to devise 
special excise taxes for it.36
The new local excise taxes do not only, as in these examples, apply to 
products—the customary realm of excise taxation. Excise taxes can be imposed 
on activities, rather than sales, as in the few localities that tax video gambling 
and slot machines,37 or as in the case of congestion taxes (repeatedly suggested 
in New York City) that charge those who drive into downtown at certain times.38
Further indicating the expansion of the realm of excise taxation—emblematic 
of the tax’s local turn—is a nascent movement among localities to create special 
categories within the non-sales-based components of their tax systems (as noted, 
excise taxes are traditionally taxes imposed on the sale of goods) that mimic, in 
their operation, the logic of excise taxation. On the property tax front, some 
                                                                                                                     
ency/theres-now-a-soda-tax-in-philadelphia-but-not-because-sugar-is-bad-for-you
[https://perma.cc/864Q-LLQ4]. Earlier such taxes were adopted on the state level and were 
rather low. See Michael F. Jacobson & Kelly D. Brownell, Small Taxes on Soft Drinks and 
Snack Foods to Promote Health, 90 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 854, 855–56 (2000).
31 See PHILA., PA., CODE § 19-4103 (2017); John Bacon, Push for Soda Taxes Across 
the USA Notches Win in Philly, USA TODAY (July 18, 2018), https://www.usatoday.com/
story/news/nation/2018/07/18/philly-soda-tax-survives-court-challenge/796104002/ 
[https://perma.cc/YTS8-WGQC].
32 See infra note 164.
33 COOK COUNTY, ILL. CODE OF ORDINANCES, §§ 74-665 to 677 (2015).
34 SEATTLE, WA. MUN. CODE ch. 5.50 (2015). Twenty-five dollars on every firearm 
sold and up to five cents on a round of ammunition. Id. The revenue is to be used for gun 
violence related research. Lynsi Burton, Seattle’s Gun Tax Revenue Falls Well Short of 
Forecast, SEATTLEPI (Aug. 15, 2017), https://www.seattlepi.com/local/article/Seattle-s-
gun-tax-falls-well-short-of-forecast-11821674.php [https://perma.cc/CET9-FRJX].
35 See Paul Koretz & Paul Krekorian, Motion to Consider Sales Tax on Firearm & 
Ammunition Sales, CITY OF L.A. (Oct. 6, 2015), http://clkrep.lacity.org/onlinedocs/2015/15-
1188_misc_10-6-15.pdf [https:// V5KL-LLCW]; Dakota Smith, Los Angeles Gun Tax under 
Consideration by City Hall, L.A. DAILY NEWS (Oct. 10, 2015), https://www.dailynews.com/
2015/10/10/los-angeles-gun-tax-under-consideration-by-city-hall/ [https://perma.cc/7CX7-
A4TS].
36 See, e.g., BOULDER, COLO., MUN. CODE tit. 3, ch. 14 (2013); DENVER, COLO., CODE 
OF ORDINANCES §§ 53-83 to 87 (2013); PORTLAND, OR., CITY CODE & CHARTER ch. 6.07 
(2016); SAN JOSE, CAL., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 4.66 (2010).
37 See, e.g., DETROIT, MICH., CODE OF ORDINANCES art. XIV, § 18-14 (1999).
38 Jim Dwyer & Winnie Hu, Driving a Car in Manhattan Could Cost $11.52 Under 
Congestion Plan, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/18/ny
region/driving-manhattan-congestion-traffic.html [on file with Ohio State Law Journal].
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cities impose special taxes on vacant, or merely underdeveloped, lots.39 Others 
may be tempted to follow the model set in Canada by Vancouver’s empty home 
tax, that applies to residences that do not serve as the owner’s or a renter’s
primary residence.40 On the income tax front, in July 2017, Seattle adopted a 
special tax applicable only to those earning high incomes.41 The measure 
purported to be a tax on the “privilege” of receiving certain amounts of pay.42
The following May, the city further adopted a business tax (or employer’s tax) 
that assumed the form of an excise tax.43 Seattle’s Employee Hours Tax, more 
popularly dubbed the “Amazon Tax,” required businesses making at least $20 
million in gross revenue to pay a tax of $275 per full-time worker per year.44
Revenues were dedicated to building or preserving affordable housing and 
providing wraparound services for the homeless.45 Seattle’s council almost 
immediately thereafter repealed the tax46—as will be discussed in Part IV—but 
in Mountain View, California (home to Google) such a measure was approved 
by the council for a November 2018 referendum,47 and other Bay Area cities—
San Francisco, East Palo Alto, Cupertino (where Apple is located)—are 
similarly exploring such an employee head tax.48
                                                                                                                     
39 See, e.g., Elaine S. Povich, Can Extra Taxes on Vacant Land Cure City Blight?, PEW 
CHARITABLE TR. (Mar. 7, 2017), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs
/stateline/2017/03/07/can-extra-taxes-on-vacant-land-cure-city-blight [https://perma.cc/
W2WD-8E4K] (discussing Washington, D.C., and municipalities in Connecticut and 
Pennsylvania); see also 8 D.C. CODE § 47-813 (2012); CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 13-12-
125(a)(1) (2011).
40 See Vancouver, B.C., Vacancy Tax By-Law No. 11674 (Nov. 16, 2016) 
(consolidated July 11, 2017).
41 SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE ch. 5.65 (2017).
42 Defined, for individuals, as annual earnings of above $250,000. Id. The tax was 
struck down by the lower court. For a discussion, see infra notes 45–48 and accompanying 
text.
43 SEATTLE, WASH., ORDINANCE 125578 (May 16, 2018) (repealed by SEATTLE, WASH.,
ORDINANCE 125592 (June 13, 2018)).
44 See Nick Wingfield, Seattle Scales Back Tax in Face of Amazon’s Revolt, but 
Tensions Linger, N.Y. TIMES (May 14, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/14/techn
ology/seattle-amazon-headquarterstax.html?dlbk=&emc=edit_dk_20180515&nl=dealbook
&nlid=30788195_dk_20180515&te=1 [on file with Ohio State Law Journal].
45 Id.
46 SEATTLE, WASH., ORDINANCE 125592 (June 13, 2018).
47 Mark Noack, Council Backs Employee Tax That Would Cost Google Millions,
MOUNTAIN VIEW VOICE (June 7, 2018, 11:11 AM), https://www.mv-voice.com/news/2018/
06/07/council-backs-employee-tax-that-would-cost-google-millions [https://perma.cc/KR5
W-JGQR]. Revenue from the annual $150 per-employee tax on big businesses will be used 
to fund transit projects and alleviate transportation pressures generated by, according to the 
council, the invasion and growth of these businesses. Id.
48 George Avalos, Silicon Valley Tsunami? Tax Plans Aimed at Apple, Google Could 
Start a New Wave, City Leaders Say, MERCURY NEWS (May 29, 2018), 
https://www.mercurynews.com/2018/05/29/apple-google-headcount-taxes-three-silicon-
valley-cities-just-the-start/ [https://perma.cc/Z532-34JP].
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B. The Motivations for Adopting Excise Taxes
Clearly, local excise taxes are on the upswing: more local governments are 
adopting more types of excise taxes. Why? Why do governments turn to this 
form of taxation? In order to assess these diverse new taxes as this Article aims 
to do, the motivations drawing municipalities to excise taxes must be identified.
Excise taxes can be said to serve four distinct, often conflicting, goals. First, 
and perhaps most obviously, like any other tax, an excise tax is a measure for 
raising revenue: by charging, for example, a levy on every cigarette sold, the 
local government is bound to enrich its coffers. As such, localities’ recent 
penchant for excise taxation can be ascribed to the financial distress many of 
them are experiencing. Cook County, for example, is strapped for resources, and 
thus its attempts to introduce new excise taxes are hardly surprising.49
Second, an excise tax may serve as a Pigouvian tax: a levy that forces buyers 
or users of a product to internalize the full social costs of the product’s
consumption.50 Some behaviors—say the smoking of a cigarette—generate 
externalities for the surrounding community and government—say harms to 
others through passive smoking or increased expenditures on public health 
services. Through the tax, the government forces the consuming actor to account 
for those social effects.51 Seattle’s Amazon Tax, for instance, was conceived as 
a mechanism forcing big corporations to experience (and in that case, fund) the 
costs of the city’s measures to alleviate the housing shortages allegedly 
generated by the influx of those corporations’ affluent employees.52
Third, excise taxes can be used not as Pigouvian levies forcing actors to take 
account of costs they generate to others, but rather as levies forcing them to take 
account of costs they generate to themselves (“internalities”). In other words, 
excise taxes may aim to divert actors not from uses that might hurt the public, 
but from uses that might hurt the actors themselves.53 Excise taxes can be born 
of a paternalistic concern, grounded in the assumption that an actor’s choice is 
not fully informed—say she is unlikely to understand the risk smoking poses to 
her own well-being—and thus external intervention in the form of a tax is 
necessary to deter her from making the choice. The recent drive to tax soda 
                                                                                                                     
49 Hal Dardick, Preckwinkle: Tax Hike, Budget Cuts on Table as County Faces $174M 
Shortfall, CHI. TRIB. (June 30, 2016), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/politics/
ct-cook-county-budget-shortfall-met-0631-20160630-story.html [https://perma.cc/89MD-
R588].
50 See generally A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (4th ed. 1962) (arguing that 
the existence of externalities justifies government intervention to discourage the activity 
producing the externalities).
51 See James R. Hines, Jr., Taxing Consumption and Other Sins, 21 J. ECON. PERSP. 49, 
64 (2007).
52 The Robot tax was also presented as pursuing after an externality: the displacement 
of workers. See Price, supra note 3.
53 See Ted O’Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Optimal Sin Taxes, 90 J. PUB. ECON. 1825, 
1826 (2006).
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draws much of its force from the alleged health and lifestyle harms these drinks 
inflict on their unknowing consumers.54
Fourth, excise taxes can be grounded not in an economic notion that the 
actor’s choice will be harmful—to others or to herself—and should thus be 
made to reflect said cost, but rather in a moralistic, or political, judgment 
respecting that choice.55 Adam Smith famously wrote: “Sugar, rum, and 
tobacco, are commodities which are no where necessaries of life, which are 
become objects of almost universal consumption, and which are therefore 
extremely proper subjects of taxation.”56 A tax on cigarettes can be a product of 
a harsh valuation of cigarettes’ moral and aesthetic worth or of that of the 
individuals smoking cigarettes. Gun taxes in cities with very few gun stores—
such as Seattle—are probably much more concerned with making a political 
statement than with raising revenue or affecting behavior.57 Plastic bag fees also 
increasingly function as political symbols: a mark of environmental resistance 
for progressives, an assault on personal choice and freedom for conservatives.58
These different goals local excise taxes are set to serve almost inevitably
conflict among themselves. Partially as a result, these local taxes, also almost 
inevitably, generate conflicts with the state’s interests. 
Consider the local cigarette tax. If the tax effectively promotes the alleged 
goal of depressing the consumption of the product deemed harmful (for 
Pigouvian or paternalistic reasons), then the number of cigarettes purchased will 
decline, and the revenue raised through the tax—an excise tax’s first goal—will 
decrease. Not only the local taxing authority, but also the state, which imposes 
                                                                                                                     
54 See supra note 30.
55 See Bruce G. Carruthers, The Semantics of Sin Tax: Politics, Morality, and Fiscal 
Imposition, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2565, 2566 (2016) (exploring the “negative social 
meanings [that] can be projected through public revenue systems”).
56 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF 
NATIONS 1016 (Edwin Cannan ed., 1994).
57 See Dan Springer, Seattle Gun Tax Failure? Firearm Sales Plummet, Violence Spikes 
After Law Passes, FOX NEWS (June 15, 2017), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2017/06
/15/seattle-gun-tax-failure-firearm-sales-plummet-violence-spikes-after-law-passes.html 
[https://perma.cc/HFW9-4GRC] (noting that only one large gun retailer operated in the city 
at the time of writing, and that when the ordinance was passed another was still in town); 
Kenworthey Bilz & Janice Nadler, Law, Moral Attitudes, and Behavioral Change, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 241, 253 (Eyal Zamir & 
Doron Teichman eds., 2014) (discussing the practice of adopting, for symbolic reasons 
alone, local regulations banning activities that do not take place within the relevant locality).
58 See Henry Grabar, When Did the Freedom to Use Plastic Bags Become a GOP 
Priority?, SLATE (June 9, 2016, 8:00 AM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/2016/06
/09/plastic_bag_bans_are_being_replaced_by_plastic_bag_ban_bans.html [https://perma.cc
/Y83K-GYVW]. A bill introduced in Texas immediately after the city of Austin adopted a 
plastic bag ban was appropriately titled the Shopping Bag Freedom Act. H.R. 2416, 83rd 
Leg. Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2013). The Bill failed. Local plastic bag bans were later struck down 
by the state’s supreme court interpreting an existing state law. City of Laredo v. Laredo 
Merchs. Org., No. 16-0748, 2018 WL 3078112, at *9 (Tex. June 22, 2018).
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a sales tax of its own on all products (and on cigarettes, its own excise tax),59
will lose funds due to the reduction in sales the local excise tax brings about.60
The local cigarette tax generates still other conflicts with the state. If 
imposed to supposedly compensate the city, as a Pigouvian tax, for the social 
costs the city bears due to residents’ consumption of cigarettes, the state may 
believe that it, not the city, actually sustains those costs—as the state carries 
most of the burden of funding social and health services.61 Even if those costs 
are borne locally, the state may believe the locality experiencing those costs is 
not necessarily the taxing locality: Berkeley residents might be buying their 
cigarettes in Oakland and smoking them in San Francisco.
Finally, if the cigarette tax expresses the city’s paternalistic or moral 
assessment of the value of consuming cigarettes, the state might not share that 
assessment. Scientific opinion might differ on the alleged health harms the taxed 
product inflicts on its user. Even if all concur on these harms, researchers might 
disagree on the supposedly beneficial effects of the product’s taxation. The city 
might find one scientific viewpoint more persuasive, while the state prefers the 
other. These conflicts can, and often are, still more bitter since not only science 
might be at stake. The excise tax might draw on political or ideological 
motivations, which may color the choice of sides in the scientific debate about 
harms the good inflicts, or even independently justify—or delegitimize—the 
tax. Support or opposition to the cigarette tax might be, for example, a function 
of the level of dedication to libertarian ideas of unbridled individual freedom. 
Local officeholders (and voters) might be less dedicated to such principles than 
their state level counterparts. As already noted, they often clearly are.
Since local excise taxes can therefore conflict with the state’s economic or 
political stances, courts are often asked to distribute excise taxing powers 
between the state and the locality. They must answer the question: can the city 
enact an excise tax, despite a potential conflict with state interests?
                                                                                                                     
59 Forty-five states collect statewide sales tax. Megan Trimble, The 10 States That 
Collect the Most Sales Tax, U.S. NEWS (Oct. 23, 2017), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-
states/articles/2017-10-23/these-10-states-collect-the-most-in-sales-tax-per-capita 
[https://perma.cc/2YC3-7LQM]. All states have a cigarettes tax. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE,
supra note 25, at 178.
60 As many have noted, tobacco taxes create a perverse incentive by which states 
become dependent on continued smoking. See, e.g., Andrew J. Haile, Sin Taxes: When the 
State Becomes the Sinner, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 1041, 1044 (2009). Consequently, many states 
regulate local cigarette taxes. See U.S. Local Tobacco Tax Authority: A 50-State Review,
TOBACCO CONTROL LEGAL CONSORTIUM, http://www.publichealthlawcenter.org/sites/
default/files/resources/tclc-tobacco-tax-authority-50-state-review-2016.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/HCL8-UP23].
61 See Paul A. Diller, Why Do Cities Innovate in Public Health? Implications of Scale 
and Structure, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 1219, 1248 (2014) (“[I]n terms of consistent, ultimate 
liability for medical costs, the state and federal governments bear much more of the financial 
burden caused by obesity and tobacco.”).
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III. THE LEGAL TREATMENT OF LOCAL EXCISE TAXATION
Almost all local excise taxes enacted so far, and described in the preceding 
Part, have faced legal challenges. Any excise tax has a built-in, and moneyed, 
interest group arrayed against it, and that group will bring a lawsuit challenging, 
as a matter of course, its enactment. The taxed industry—the producers of the 
product being subject to an excise tax or its sellers—would rather see the tax not 
introduced and will ask a court to strike the tax down once locally enacted. 
In seeking a remedy against local action from courts, such plaintiffs will 
make a claim on behalf of state power and point at the city’s subservient status.62
American law aids them in their pursuit of this claim, as local government law’s
basic tenet is that, unlike the state, the city is not a government of plenary 
powers.63 From this basic principle, two relevant, and key, doctrinal 
ramifications ensue. Any city action can be challenged as, first, unauthorized by 
the state to begin with, and, second, even if authorized, as preempted by the
state’s own action in the relevant field. This Part reviews, in turn, courts’
treatment of both these types of claims as they have been raised against local 
excise taxation. It finds that courts have—surprisingly—shown themselves to 
be unreceptive both to the claim that cities lack the power to initiate an excise 
tax and to the claim that a city’s excise tax is preempted by other state acts. The 
cumulative effect of these two strands of decisions—coupled with decisions, to 
be reviewed last, dealing with claims against local excise taxes emanating from 
constitutional rules applicable specifically to local taxation—is that, as far as 
local excise taxation goes, courts have reversed their attitude towards the city’s
impotence in its interactions with the state
A. The Local Power to Initiate an Excise Tax
As a government of limited powers and as a creature of the state, the city 
can only act if the state authorizes it to act. The source of power for a city action 
can assume two forms. First, a specific state statute may grant the city a 
particular power (e.g., a state law specifically empowering municipalities to 
adopt cigarette taxes).64 Second, even in the absence of a specific enabling 
statute, the city can be authorized to act under its general, often constitutional, 
home rule powers (assuming the specific city is a home rule municipality). 
Home rule powers typically dispense with the city’s need for a specific enabling 
act by authorizing the city to initiate policies pertaining to “local” affairs.65
Cities’ ability to act under both these empowerment tools has been severely 
curbed through restrictive judicial interpretation. Some courts still resort to local 
                                                                                                                     
62 Challengers may, of course, make other, additional claims against the tax—claims 
not relying on the locality’s subservience to the state—but those are not of interest here.
63 See supra note 5.
64 GERALD E. FRUG ET AL., LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 147–48 
(6th ed. 2015).
65 Id. at 174–76.
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government law’s traditional “Dillon’s Rule,” which mandates that judges 
construe narrowly individual enabling acts granting powers to cities.66
Similarly, through interpretation, courts constrict the type of affairs 
characterized as “local” and thus falling within cities’ home rule initiative 
powers.67
In the specific context of local excise taxation, however, courts have 
abandoned these twin interpretive conventions that tightly delimit the space 
available for local policy initiatives under either state enabling acts or home rule 
powers. If anything, when considering local excise taxes, courts have reversed 
the twin conventions. 
The reversal of attitude is most apparent in courts’ dealings with state 
enabling acts. When a city argues that the excise tax it has adopted is authorized 
by a specific state enabling act, the ensuing litigation centers on the 
interpretation of that act. Much of the excise tax litigation has dealt with this 
question, as challengers contend that a contested local excise tax does not fall 
within the lawmaking authorization contained in a state statute enabling the 
enactment of local taxes. Such claims are particularly cogent in light not only of 
Dillon’s Rule, but also due to the specific rule of interpretation applicable to tax 
laws. That rule requires that these laws be construed narrowly and against the 
taxing authority.68
Nonetheless, courts analyzing enabling acts in the specific context of local 
excise taxes have rejected this line of reasoning and decisions. Indeed, they 
appear to have adopted the exact opposite view whereby—at least when at issue 
is the power to enact an excise tax—statutes enabling local taxation should be 
interpreted broadly.69 The consequence is that a law generally empowering a 
local government to adopt taxes suffices to legitimize any local excise tax. To 
wit, courts have embraced city claims that a tax enabling act validates all local 
excise taxes—even those, as the ones litigated in some such cases, not 
specifically endorsed, or even contemplated, by the state legislature.70 Courts 
                                                                                                                     
66 See JOHN F. DILLON, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
§ 237 (5th ed. 1911). Dillon’s Rule allows local government exercises of power in three 
situations: (1) when granted in express words; (2) when necessarily or fairly implied in or 
incidental to the powers expressly granted; and (3) when essential to the accomplishment of 
the declared objects and purposes of the [municipal] corporation—not simply convenient, 
but indispensable. Id.
67 See David J. Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2255, 2349 (2003).
68 See, e.g., City of Birmingham v. Orbitz, LLC, 93 So. 3d 932, 936 (Ala. 2012); 
DENNIS JENSEN & GAIL A. O’GRADNEY, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 44.13
(Eugene McQuillan ed., 2003) (“The grant of any power to tax, made by the state to 
municipal corporations, will be, according to the rule accepted by virtually all the authorities, 
construed strictly.”).
69 E.g., Fannon v. Matanuska-Susitna Borough, 192 P.3d 982, 989 (Alaska 2008) 
(holding that the state act enabling local taxes grants a broad authority); Puget Sound Energy, 
Inc. v. City of Bellingham, 259 P.3d 345, 348 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011).
70 E.g., Fannon, 192 P.3d at 988 (failing to find any support for the claim that because 
no statute makes an express delegation of authority to levy the contested excise taxes, the 
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have also read the carveouts from tax enabling statutes in a narrow fashion to 
further promote local excise taxation.71 They have similarly insisted that an 
excise tax is not a sales tax when the enabling act allowed for local taxes other 
than the sales tax.72 To allow for excise taxes’ introduction, courts even 
generated their own exceptions to provisions of tax enabling acts banning the 
initiation of local taxes in certain circumstances.73
This judicial result—by which a general tax enabling act can almost always 
count as the basis for any local excise tax—contains another interpretive 
maneuver, one that is necessary for the outcome of the cases but is hardly 
acknowledged. Even if a tax enabling act is construed broadly to allow any local 
tax, an excise levy could be conceived as authorized by it only if that levy were 
held to actually be a “tax.”74 As a general rule, courts define taxes as measures 
to raise revenue.75 But, as noted in Part II.B., excise taxes are often not wholly—
and at times not at all—measures to raise revenue.76 Sometimes they are better 
described as regulatory or political measures, motivated by the goal of 
disincentivizing a behavior due to its externalities, paternalistic concerns, or a 
community’s ideological aversion.77 Court decisions appear to disregard this 
characteristic of excise taxes. Courts seldom think twice before, at least 
implicitly, conceiving excise levies as conventional revenue-raising measures 
that thus automatically meet the legal definition of a tax (and are hence 
                                                                                                                     
local government lacks the authority to enact it); Sheehan v. Cent. Puget Sound Reg’l Transit 
Auth., 123 P.3d 88, 93 (Wash. 2005) (same with motor registration tax).
71 E.g., Williams v. City of Phila., 188 A.3d 421, 431 (Pa. 2018) (holding that a 
statutory limitation on the taxing power should be read narrowly in light of “the legislative 
design of an expansive delegation of taxing power”).
72 E.g., Fannon, 192 P.3d at 988–89 (holding that since it was an excise tax rather than 
a sales tax, a local government could enact a tobacco tax without submitting it for voter 
approval); see also Blair Candy Co. v. Altoona Area Sch. Dist., 613 A.2d 159, 161 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. 1992). Though the case’s factual settings were slightly different, the practical 
result was the same: a school district was able to enforce a levy on a cigarette seller because 
the court labeled the cigarette tax an excise tax and as such characterized it as distinct from 
the sales tax. Id.
73 E.g., Cal. Cannabis Coal. v. City of Upland, 401 P.3d 49, 65–66 (Cal. 2017). The 
court held that the term “local government” in a constitutional provision limiting the power 
of local governments to impose general taxes did not cover a decision through local initiative. 
Id. Perhaps not unrelatedly, commentators have noted that cities adopting a soda tax through 
popular initiative—all of them located in California—did not see those taxes challenged in 
court. Sarah A. Roache et al., Big Food and Soda Versus Public Health: Industry Litigation 
Against Local Government Regulations to Promote Healthy Diets, 45 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
1051, 1084 (2018).
74 See Wheeler v. Charter Township of Shelby, 697 N.W.2d 180, 186–87 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 2005) (discussing the categorization of an ordinance by the local legislature as either 
an allowable fee or a tax).
75 E.g., id. at 186 (“A ‘tax’ . . . is designed to raise revenue.” (quoting Bolt v. City of 
Lansing, 587 N.W.2d 264, 269 (Mich. 1998))).
76 See Carruthers, supra note 55, at 2567.
77 See id. at 2567–68.
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allowable under tax enabling acts).78 Courts casually note that an excise tax 
naturally falls within the contours of the category of “tax.”79 One court 
nonchalantly admitted that almost all levies are legally described as such.80
Courts are accordingly willing to ignore indicators that a given excise tax 
was not devised simply as a random revenue-raising measure.81 In one rather 
striking example, a city’s gun excise tax was upheld as a tax although the 
ordinance’s legislative history was laden with city council members’ pro-gun 
control statements, and although the levy’s revenues were to be segregated from 
the city’s general revenue fund—and dedicated to specific gun safety 
purposes.82 In light of such holdings, it is hardly surprising that no challenges 
have been raised against the alleged “tax” nature of excise taxes highly unlikely 
to ever meaningfully generate revenue,83 or of those with respect to which the 
adopting city explicitly stated that low tax receipts were indicative not of the 
tax’s failure but rather of its success (in suppressing the taxed activity).84
One single, recent exception to this judicial pattern of mechanically 
categorizing excise levies as taxes can be found. Earlier this year, a Colorado 
court concluded that an excise tax—a plastic bag levy—was not a tax, seeing 
that its primary purpose was unrelated to revenue-raising.85 That conclusion was 
reached, however, precisely in order to salvage the tax: in that case the city 
                                                                                                                     
78 E.g., Congregation v. Mayor of Balt., 183 A.3d 845, 849 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2018) 
(holding a charge, although named a fee, to be a tax because the “only obligation under the 
statute is to pay the charge”).
79 “Under the Sterling Act, the city has broad powers to levy taxes for revenue 
purposes.” Blauner’s, Inc. v. City of Phila., 198 A. 889, 891 (Pa. 1938) (citation omitted).
80 Callaway v. City of Overland Park, 508 P.2d 902, 907–08 (Kan. 1973) (holding that 
practically all levies could count as an excise tax).
81 E.g., Centex Real Estate Corp. v. City of Vallejo, 19 Cal. App. 4th 1358, 1363 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1993) (holding that since it was set to raise revenue, a property excise tax was a tax 
under the state enabling act—although that levy was specifically adopted to replace local 
development fees the city’s advisors suggested might not be authorized by state law).
82 Watson v. City of Seattle, 401 P.3d 1, 8–9 (Wash. 2017).
83 Though the Seattle gun tax was assailed for its legislative history and for the uses to 
which the funds collected were to be applied, revenue projections—rather low to begin with 
and mostly undisclosed to plaintiffs by the city—were not litigated. The court simply noted 
it was a measure to raise revenue. Id. at 10. When the city finally disclosed the revenue 
projections, they were indeed strikingly low. When adopted, the city finance agency 
predicted an annual revenue of $300,000 to $500,000. Burton, supra note 34. The actual 
intake in the tax’s first year, 2016, was only $103,766.22. Id.
84 Amanda Svachula, Bag Tax Missing Revenue Goal but City Touts Drop in Use of 
Disposables, CHI. SUN-TIMES (July 5, 2017, 8:38 AM), https://chicago.suntimes.com/busin
ess/bag-tax-falling-short-of-revenue-goal-but-is-decreasing-bag-use/[https://perma.cc/7T
TT-3VRJ] (reporting that a spokeswoman for Chicago’s Department of Finance, discussing 
the city’s plastic bag tax, “said [that] though the revenue collection is ‘below what we 
expected,’ the city hoped to discourage bag use with the tax, and ‘it’s a benefit that residents 
are responding’”). The city “aimed to raise $9.2 million from the 7-cents-a-bag fee in its first 
year.” Id. In its first five months, the tax raised only $2.4 million. Id.
85 Colo. Union of Taxpayers Found. v. City of Aspen, 418 P.3d 506, 514 (Colo. 2018).
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lacked the power to enact any tax.86 By treating the bag levy as regulatory, the 
court validated the local power to enact the excise tax nonetheless.87 Evidently, 
in striking contrast to their practice elsewhere with respect to local action, courts 
are endeavoring to detect, through almost any possible interpretation, statutory 
authority for the adoption of local excise taxes.88
Consequently, cities do not often have to call upon their general home rule 
initiative powers when acting in the field. But when they have appealed to those 
powers—in those cases where no enabling act was available or could, even 
under the most liberal of constructions, be read as allowing the local excise 
tax—courts have shown similar latitude.89 As noted, home rule powers enable 
their holders to initiate an action even in the absence of a specific state enabling 
act if that action is “local.”90 Despite constrictive readings of the term “local”
in other home rule cases—including cases involving other forms of local 
taxation91—courts have been willing to read the scope of local affairs subject to 
home rule broadly to include any local excise tax.92 They often characterize in 
such cases the power to tax for local purposes as clearly a privilege accorded by 
home rule constitutional provisions.93 Since the power is thereby grounded 
directly in the state constitution, no need for a specific act enabling a contested 
excise tax is necessary.94 The fact that the local excise tax is not, unlike the 
traditional property tax, a tax on inherently local property and can apply to non-
local residents does not change the analysis: the excise tax is still held to be a
proper exercise of home rule municipal authority upon a local matter.95 As the 
Illinois court approving Cook County’s soda tax recently concluded: “Home 
rule taxing power has been challenged many times, and a review of dozens of 
                                                                                                                     
86 Id. at 509.
87 Id. at 515.
88 Id. at 514.
89 See, e.g., Ill. Retail Merchants Ass’n v. Cook Cty. Dep’t of Revenue, No. 17 L 50596, 
2017 WL 3318078, at *2 (Ill. Cir. Ct. 2017).
90 See Midwest Gaming & Entm’t, LLC v. Cty. of Cook, 39 N.E.3d 286, 302 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 2015).
91 See Scharff, supra note 11, at 300.
92 See, e.g., Midwest Gaming & Entm’t, 39 N.E.3d at 317; Ill. Retail Merchants Ass’n,
2017 WL 3318078, at *14.
93 E.g., Weekes v. City of Oakland, 579 P.3d 449, 452 (Cal. 1978); Franklin v. Peterson, 
197 P.2d 788, 791 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1948) (“That taxation for municipal purposes is a 
municipal affair and that the power to levy such a tax stems directly from the Constitution is 
no longer open to question.”); Exec. Aircraft Consulting, Inc. v. City of Newton, 845 P.2d 
57, 60 (Kan. 1993) (“Home rule empowers the defendants to levy any type of exaction unless 
the legislature preempts the field by uniform enactment.”).
94 E.g., Deluxe Theatres, Inc. v. City of Englewood, 596 P.2d 771, 772 (Colo. 1979) 
(stating that the power to impose a local excise tax is “essential to the full exercise of the 
right to self-government granted to home rule cities by Article XX”). Ex parte Braun, 74 P. 
780, 783–84 (Cal. 1903).
95 See, e.g., City of Englewood v. Wright, 364 P.2d 569, 574 (Colo. 1961).
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relevant cases can lead one to conclude that government’s ability to tax is only 
limited by its creative reasonableness.”96
B. The State’s Power to Preempt a Local Excise Tax
Even if, thanks to the courts’ broad interpretation of a state enabling statute 
or of the city’s home rule powers, a city enjoys the power to initiate a given 
policy, the state still enjoys the power to overrule the specific policy the city has 
adopted.97 Since in the American legal scheme cities are subservient to the state, 
the city always operates under the threat of state preemption.98 While this power 
of the state is unquestionable (other than in the few states that recognize home 
rule immunity—as will be discussed below), the question often arises whether 
in a given case the state legislature has actually exercised the preemption 
power.99 Specifically, when there is no clear statutory statement that local action 
is prohibited, courts must determine whether the local action was still prohibited 
by some state statute—implicitly.100
Traditionally, courts have been rather willing to find such implied 
preemption.101 Even if no state statute states that the specific action the city 
initiated is prohibited, courts will strike down that action if they discern a 
contradictory intention on the state’s part.102 Courts have thus ruled that if the 
city bans an activity the state has not banned when dealing with a similar subject 
matter, the local ban might be preempted—as the state implicitly allowed the 
activity.103 For example, the Pennsylvania court, in this fashion, struck down a 
city ordinance barring drug paraphernalia not covered by the state statute that 
otherwise regulated drug dealing and use.104 Following a similar logic, courts 
block any city action in policy fields they regard as occupied by the state.105 For 
example, the Maryland court invalidated a city ordinance prohibiting the 
placement of cigarette vending machines in areas accessible to minors although 
no state law prevented such a local ordinance.106 The court explained that: “In 
view of the General Assembly’s long and exclusive control of [the sale of 
cigarettes] in this State, the Legislature’s failure to foresee and take action 
expressly to prevent future local government trespass in this area of exclusive 
state legislative authority is no support for the validity of the . . . ordinances.”107
                                                                                                                     
96 Ill. Retail Merchants Ass’n, 2017 WL 3318078, at *2.
97 Paul Diller, Intrastate Preemption, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1113, 1114 (2007).
98 Id.
99 Id. at 1157 n.215.
100 Id. at 1116.
101 See id. at 1174 n.310.
102 See id. at 1156–57.
103 Diller, supra note 97, at 1142–45.
104 Holt’s Cigar Co. v. City of Phila., 10 A.3d 902, 913 (Pa. 2011).
105 See Diller, supra note 97, at 1153.
106 Allied Vending, Inc. v. City of Bowie, 631 A.2d 77, 78, 87–88 (Md. 1993).
107 Id. at 88 (quoting Cty. Council v. Montgomery Ass’n, Inc., 333 A.2d 596, 600 n.5 
(1975)).
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That is, though no conceivable conflict existed between the local ordinance and 
state laws, the local government was prohibited from curbing the trade in 
cigarettes simply because the state had been regulating that trade.108
This reigning judicial approach embracing implied preemption should not 
have bode well for local excise taxation. Excise taxation, by definition, adds to, 
if not interferes with, the state’s own sales tax covering the relevant products.109
Furthermore, because, as noted in Part II.B., they entertain regulatory goals, 
excise taxes focus on such fields (e.g., the consumption of cigarettes) that are 
heavily regulated by the state.110 Excise taxes are often labelled “sin taxes” and 
sinning tends to be policed by the state.111
Surprisingly, however, courts have largely refused to attribute to state sales 
taxes or state regulatory measures an implicit intention to preempt the local 
imposition of excise taxes on the activity those state laws tax and regulate.112 A
local excise tax, courts hold, will not be preempted just because a state sales tax 
is present—the fact that the two tax the same subject notwithstanding.113 While 
                                                                                                                     
108 In another example, a federal court of appeals struck down a regulation adopted by 
New York City in 2009 requiring that retail vendors of cigarettes post prominent, graphic 
warning signs near cigarette sale areas as preempted by a federal statute requiring that 
cigarette packages include a warning label. 94th St. Grocery Corp. v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Health, 
685 F.3d 174, 177, 181–82 (2d Cir. 2012). The court found that in adopting that statute, the 
federal government preempted other governments from imposing additional or different 
packaging requirements. Id.
109 Williams v. City of Phila., 188 A.3d 421, 432 (Pa. 2018) (discussing the claim that 
an excise tax was preempted since the beverages subjected to it are also subject to the state 
sales tax).
110 Williams v. City of Phila., 164 A.3d 576, 588 n.19 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2017) (citing 
Blair Candy Co. v. Altoona Area Sch. Dist., 613 A.2d 159, 161–62 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992)), 
aff’d, 188 A.3d 421 (Pa. 2018).
111 See Haile, supra note 60, at 1042.
112 But see Commonwealth v. Wilsbach Distributors, Inc., 519 A.2d 397, 402 (Pa. 1986). 
In that case, the court held that the state legislature had adopted a scheme of regulation of 
the alcoholic beverage industry so pervasive that it had preempted the field and a city was 
prohibited from taxing a malt and brewed beverage distributor. Id. at 402–03. The court 
focused on the exceptional nature of the regulation of alcoholic beverages, rendering it a 
special case. Id. at 400. It stressed that there is no other field “within which the exercise of 
the police power of a state is more plenary than in the regulation and control of the use and 
sale of alcoholic beverages.” Id. It noted, for example, that the state scheme not only included 
a state excise tax, but actually mandated that the tax be paid to the locality in which the seller 
was located. Id. at 401. The Pennsylvania court relied on this distinguishing factor when in 
subsequent cases it refused to expand the case’s holding and preempt local taxes in other 
fields. Rieders v. City of Williamsport, 578 A.2d 618, 619–20 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990); City 
of Phila. v. Tax Review Bd. ex rel. Scott, 601 A.2d 875, 878 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992). Even 
with respect to the specific issue of taxing liquor, the reach of the holding has been limited. 
City of Phila. v. Clement & Muller, Inc., 715 A.2d 397, 397–98 (Pa. 1998).
113 Cincinnati Bell Tel. Co. v. City of Cincinnati, 693 N.E.2d 212, 217 (Ohio 1998)
(overruling earlier precedents and holding that the fact that the state has a pertinent tax does 
not prevent a municipality from enacting an excise tax in the field—there will be no implied 
preemption); Williams v. City of Phila., 188 A.3d 421, 437 (Pa. 2018).
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the general argument respecting the preemptive power of the sales tax thus 
normally fails, those recently challenging, in a closely followed lawsuit,
Philadelphia’s soda tax as preempted by the state’s sales tax appeared to stand 
on firmer grounds.114 A Pennsylvania statute explicitly bars the city from taxing 
a “subject” also taxed by the state.115 The beverages to which the city tax applies 
are also, naturally, covered by the state sales tax.116 The soda tax thus appears
duplicative of the state sales tax and thus not only implicitly preempted by that 
state tax, but also explicitly preempted by the state statute.117 Nonetheless, the 
court rejected the preemption claim.118 For the state supreme court’s majority, 
the fact that the city’s soda tax was designed to be charged on the beverages’
distributors, rather than on the individual purchasers, sufficed to render it non-
duplicative of the state sales tax.119 That the city tax applied only to distributors 
providing the beverages for retail purposes in the city, that it required actual 
dealers in the city to pay the tax if the distributor they received the beverages 
from had not done so, and that the mayor and council consistently debated and 
presented the tax as a tax on sweetened-beverages’ buyers—factors leading a 
dissenting justice to tersely note “[a] rose by any other name smells just as 
sweet”—were all facts the majority deemed irrelevant.120 This ruling 
underscores the general observation: courts are reluctant to find that a state sales 
tax preempts a local excise tax. 
Likewise, a state’s regulatory scheme will also be insufficient to imply 
preemption of a local excise tax imposed on the regulated good or activity.121
Courts’ pronouncements to this effect have been forceful. The California court 
declared: “That the state has preempted a field of statewide concern for purposes 
of regulation does not itself prevent local taxation of the persons or activities 
regulated.”122 When plaintiffs argued that a local amusement admission tax 
imposed on a racetrack was preempted by the state’s own policing of horse 
racing, the Illinois court answered: “the power to regulate and the power to tax 
are separate and distinct powers.”123 The reason is that the latter power, unlike 
the former, is “essential” to cities and is thus “intended . . . to be broad,” as
explained by a court applying this rule to reject the claim that a local gambling 
machine tax was preempted by the state’s extensive regulation of gambling.124
                                                                                                                     
114 Williams, 164 A.3d at 581–82, aff’d, 188 A.3d 421 (Pa. 2018).
115 53 PA. STAT. ANN. § 15971(a) (West 1961).
116 Williams v. City of Phila., 188 A.3d 421, 425 (Pa. 2018).
117 Id.
118 Id. at 437.
119 Id. at 434.
120 Id. at 445–46 (Wecht, J., dissenting).
121 Pines v. City of Santa Monica, 630 P.2d 521, 524 (Cal. 1981).
122 Id. at 522.
123 Town of Cicero v. Fox Valley Trotting Club, Inc., 357 N.E.2d 1118, 1120 (Ill. 1976).
124 Midwest Gaming & Entm’t, LLC v. Cty. of Cook, 39 N.E.3d 286, 303 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2015) (quoting Mulligan v. Dunne, 338 N.E.2d 6 (Ill. 1975)).
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A Washington decision from the summer of 2017 provides the most extreme 
illustration for this attitude.125 The state’s supreme court had to rule on the fate 
of Seattle’s gun excise tax, described in Part II. A Washington state statute 
provides that:
The state of Washington hereby fully occupies and preempts the entire field of 
firearms regulation within the boundaries of the state, including the 
registration, licensing, possession, purchase, sale, acquisition, transfer, 
discharge, and transportation of firearms. . . . Cities, towns, and counties or 
other municipalities may enact only those laws and ordinances relating to 
firearms that are specifically authorized by state law.126
Stronger, clearer preemption language could hardly have been imagined. 
Yet the court decided that the statute did not explicitly—or even implicitly—
preempt the city gun excise tax.127 The statute, the court explained, only 
preempted police action in the field of firearms, not taxation.128 A tax on the 
sale of firearms is not a regulation of the sale of firearms, the court insisted.129
If the state wants to preempt a local excise tax on guns, it must state explicitly 
its opposition to local gun taxes.130
Thus, unlike the general rule respecting preemption, “the preemption or 
restraint of municipal taxing authority may be accomplished only through 
specific, express statutory language.”131 The local excise tax must be “in direct 
and immediate conflict with a state statute or statutory scheme.”132 Courts, 
accordingly, tend to read state statutes very narrowly, shielding city excise taxes 
from implied preemption.133 For example, the Colorado court, confronted with 
a state constitutional clause preserving to the state the power to tax self-
propelled construction equipment, insisted that the clause preempted only local 
ad valorem taxes, not excise taxes, and then strained to define a Denver tax on 
                                                                                                                     
125 Watson v. City of Seattle, 401 P.3d 1, 14 (Wash. 2017).
126 WASH. REV. CODE § 9.41.290 (1994) (emphasis added).
127 Watson, 401 P.3d at 12.
128 Id. at 13.
129 Id. at 4.
130 Id. at 12; see also ERP, Inc. v. Ali, No. 13 CH 07263, slip op. at 3–4 (Ill. Cir. Ct. 
2014) (holding that an Illinois statute preempting local “regulation, licensing, possession, 
registration, and transportation” of firearms did not preempt the Cook County gun excise tax 
since “[t]axes are conspicuously absent from the list of measures that are preempted”).
131 Commonwealth Title Ins. v. City of Tacoma, 502 P.2d 1024, 1026 (Wash. 1972) (“In 
general, a city or municipality may define its taxation categories as it sees fit unless it is 
restrained by a constitutional provision or legislative enactment.”); Enter. Leasing, Inc. v. 
City of Tacoma, Fin. Dep’t, 970 P.2d 339, 342 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999) aff’d sub nom, Enter. 
Leasing, Inc. v. City of Tacoma, 988 P.2d 961, 966 (Wash. 1999).
132 Weekes v. City of Oakland, 579 P.2d 449, 452 (Cal. 1978).
133 Restraints on taxing authority will be found only if there is “specific, express 
statutory language.” Enter. Leasing, 970 P.2d at 342 (citing Commonwealth Title, 502 P.2d 
at 1026), aff’d, 988 P.2d 961.
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the equipment as an excise tax.134 The Nebraska court held that the state statute 
limiting the overall rate of local sales taxes did not apply to local excise taxes—
and thus allowed a local excise tax on restaurants and drinking places.135
Courts’ sympathy to local excise taxes in the preemption context extends 
still further. A few states supplement cities’ home rule power to initiate 
policies—discussed above in Part III.A.—with the power of immunity 
extending over some of those local actions.136 That is, in those states, state laws 
cannot preempt certain local acts home rule cities adopt.137 As commentators 
note, courts have proven very reluctant to actually apply such constitutional 
protections.138 The Colorado court, for example, will only recognize immunity 
for home rule city acts that are purely local, i.e., involve no statewide interest 
whatsoever.139 Since practically any local act may be said to portend some, at 
least minimal, effects on some state concern, the state’s courts have refused to 
extend immunity to most forms of local regulation.140 At the same time, 
however, those same courts have declared that excise taxes are a matter solely 
of local and municipal concern.141 Thus, home rule immunity protected local 
excise taxes from even explicit attempts by the state legislature to displace them 
or to exempt certain entities from their reach.142 In similar cases, the California 
courts have also been inclined to view excise taxes as purely local and thus 
shielded by home rule immunity—though the California view in this regard is 
less uniform.143 California’s home rule immunity has also served to protect and 
simplify the procedure for adopting local excise taxes: invoking the city’s home 
rule immunity, a court held that a city council could decide in a simple majority 
to submit a new local excise tax—on guns—to voter approval, despite a state 
                                                                                                                     
134 Winslow Constr. Co. v. City of Denver, 960 P.2d 685, 690–92 (Colo. 1998).
135 Anthony, Inc. v. City of Omaha, 813 N.W.2d 467, 475–78 (Neb. 2012).
136 Paul A. Diller, Reorienting Home Rule: Part 2–Remedying the Urban Disadvantage 
Through Federalism and Localism, 77 LA. L. REV. 1045, 1049 (2017).
137 Id. at 1066.
138 See e.g., Briffault, supra note 1, at 2012; Schragger, supra note 1, at 1221.
139 E.g., Webb v. City of Black Hawk, 295 P.3d 480, 492–93 (Colo. 2013).
140 See Diller, supra note 136, at 1069.
141 E.g., Town of Avon v. Weststar Bank, 151 P.3d 631, 634 (Colo. App. 2006).
142 Security Life & Accident Co. v. Temple, 492 P.2d 63, 64 (Colo. 1972); see also
Winslow Constr. Co. v. City of Denver, 960 P.2d 685, 692 (Colo. 1998) (statute of 
limitations established by state statute cannot be applied to home-rule municipalities).
143 An early decision announced that: “No doubt is entertained upon the proposition that 
the levy of taxes by a municipality for revenue purposes, including license taxes, is strictly 
a municipal affair.” W. Coast Advert. Co. v. City of S.F., 95 P.2d 138, 143 (Cal. 1939). The 
more recent pronouncement is somewhat more qualified: “levy of taxes for city purposes is 
generally a municipal affair.” City of San Bernardino Hotel/Motel Ass’n v. City of San 
Bernardino, 59 Cal. App. 4th 237, 242 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997). In practice, the courts appear to 
be in the habit of distinguishing taxes, deciding which are of some statewide concern and 
can thus be preempted, e.g., Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. City of L.A., 812 P.2d 916, 930 
(Cal. 1991) (taxation of financial institutions), and which are purely local and cannot be 
preempted, e.g., Fielder v. City of L.A., 14 Cal. App. 4th 137, 146, 635 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) 
(a property transfer tax).
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law that required a two-thirds majority.144 The shielding of local excise taxes 
from simple legislative preemption is even possible at least in one state that does 
not recognize home rule immunity at all. The Illinois Constitution holds that 
only a law approved by the vote of three-fifths of the members of each house of 
the state legislature may deny or limit the local power to tax.145
C. Restrictions Applicable to Local Taxing Powers 
Apart from the two central hurdles standing in the way of any local action—
which inevitably affect the local power to adopt an excise tax—there are legal 
impediments specific to the adoption of a tax measure. At least two merit a brief 
discussion since on their face they present a true threat to the legality of local 
excise taxes: state constitutions’ uniformity in taxation clauses and the federal 
preemption of state and local taxes. 
In all states but two, a constitutional uniformity clause requires that local 
taxation be unvarying throughout the taxing local jurisdiction, and in the other 
two states court decisions have adopted the requirement.146 The uniformity 
requirement invalidates classifications that treat similar taxpayers, or taxed 
properties, differently.147 Excise taxes by definition create classifications: they 
apply to some products but not others. Hence they appear to run afoul of 
uniformity restrictions, especially in cases where they rely, for principled or 
practical reasons, on subcategorizations even among the one group of products 
that is taxed.
Still, uniformity clauses hardly ever lead courts to strike down local excise 
taxes. Most courts have simply held that constitutional uniformity clauses flat 
out do not apply to local excise taxes.148 To the extent courts provide a 
reasoning, the rationale appears to be that it is impossible to apply a uniformity 
requirement to excise taxes,149 or, perhaps due to similar thinking, that the 
                                                                                                                     
144 Traders Sports, Inc. v. City of San Leandro, 93 Cal. App. 4th 37, 49 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2001).
145 ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(g).
146 John M. Payne, Intergovernmental Condemnation as a Problem in Public Finance,
61 TEX. L. REV. 949, 970 n.79 (1983).
147 Laurie Reynolds, Uniformity of Taxation and the Preservation of Local Control in 
School Finance Reform, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1835, 1846 (2007).
148 E.g., In re Hunter’s Estate, 49 P.2d 1009, 1012 (Colo. 1935); Jersey Cent. Power & 
Light Co. v. City of Asbury Park, 24 A.2d 526, 529 (N.J. 1942), aff’d sub nom. Jersey Cent. 
Power & Light Co. v. Monmouth Cty. Bd. of Taxation, 29 A.2d 139, 139 (N.J. 1942); H.G. 
Hill Co. v. Whitice, 258 S.W. 407, 409 (Tenn. 1924); In re Estate of Hambleton, 335 P.3d 
398, 403, 413–14 (Wash. 2014); Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 137 N.W.2d 442, 
451 (Wis. 1965); Ludwig v. Harston, 197 P.2d 252, 256–57 (Wyo. 1948).
149 Belcher Oil Co. v. Dade Cty., 271 So. 2d 118, 123 (Fla. 1972); Unemployment 
Comp. Comm’n v. Renner, 143 P.2d 181, 185 (Wyo. 1943).
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constitutional requirements had in mind the property tax—not the categorically 
distinct excise tax.150
A few states do subject local excise taxes to uniformity clauses,151 but even 
there, local excise taxes have fared surprisingly well. When interpreting 
constitutional uniformity clauses courts generally insist that the “mandate [of a 
uniformity clause] generally applies only within classes, not between
classes.”152 As long as the division of different properties or taxpayers into 
different classes is somewhat rational, the tax will be upheld as uniform and in 
compliance with the constitutional clause.153 This highly deferential approach 
is particularly hospitable to a classification regime an excise tax creates—seeing 
that, as Part II.B. showed, that classification almost always has some rationale—
economic, health-based, or philosophical—underlying it. Courts deem these 
different rationales more than sufficient.154 Thus, for example, a court found 
reasonable a classification for tax purposes of amusements into three categories: 
motion pictures, operas, and plays; racing and mechanical or animal contests;
and dance halls, night clubs, and skating rinks.155
In a similar manner soda taxes have recently survived uniformity analysis. 
A Pennsylvania court held that creating a separate class of distributors of certain 
beverages and taxing them based on volume with total disregard to the value of 
the beverages they sold was rational.156 An Illinois court rejected a uniformity 
challenge to an even more minute classification: between “ready-to-drink, pre-
made sweetened beverages,” such as a bottled Frappuccino, that would be 
taxable, and “on-demand, custom-made sweetened beverages,” such as a hand-
made Frappuccino, that would not.157 Since ready-to-drink beverages are more 
                                                                                                                     
150 Ogrinz v. James, 524 A.2d 77, 85 (Md. 1987); State v. Galyen, 378 N.W.2d 182, 186 
(Neb. 1985); see also In re Hunter’s Estate, 49 P.2d at 1012 (excluding excise taxes since 
the requirement only applies to direct or ad valorem taxes).
151 Amidon v. Kane, 279 A.2d 53, 58 (Pa. 1971) (holding that all taxes are subject to the 
uniformity clause).
152 Hegar v. Tex. Small Tobacco Coal., 496 S.W.3d 778, 785 (Tex. 2016), reh’g denied,
(Sept. 23, 2016).
153 Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Comm’n of Webster Cty., 488 U.S. 336, 344 
(1989); Estate of Kosakowski v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 26 N.J. Tax 21, 36–37 (N.J. Tax Ct. 
2011).
154 See Wittenberg v. Mutton, 280 P.2d 359, 363 (Or. 1955) (holding that despite 
uniformity requirements a city “may lay an excise on the operations of a particular kind of 
business, and exempt some other kind of business closely akin thereto” (quoting Steward 
Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 583, 584 (1937))); Dancetown, U.S.A., Inc. v. State, 
439 S.W.2d 333, 336 (Tex. 1969) (“Differences in the commodities sold or services rendered 
are generally regarded as a proper basis for classification in the absence of any showing to 
the contrary.”).
155 Dancetown, 439 S.W.2d at 336–37.
156 Williams v. City of Phila., 164 A.3d 576, 596 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2017), aff’g, No. 
1452, 2016 WL 7422362, at *5 (Pa. Com. Pl. 2016), aff’d, 188 A.3d 421 (Pa. 2018).
157 Ill. Retail Merchants Ass’n v. Cook Cty. Dep’t of Revenue, No. 17 L 50596, 2017 
WL 3318078, at *4 (Ill. Cir. Ct. 2017).
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readily available, and since the costs of administering the tax to such drinks are 
much lower, the classification was pronounced reasonable.158
Convenience in imposing an excise tax and in pursuing its policy goals thus 
suffices to justify its non-uniform character. Arguments that the class subjected 
to the excise tax is under-inclusive given the excise tax’s purposes—e.g., that a 
bottled water tax is irrational since it does not tax other bottled drinks, including 
carbonated water—are irrelevant since the sole question is whether a reasonable 
relationship exists between the product taxed and the justification for the tax.159
Such a relationship can almost always be found, and thus despite an excise tax’s 
inherently limited reach, uniformity clauses present little to no threat to a local 
excise tax.
Like state constitutional limitations on the power of taxation, federal 
constitutional limits on such powers have been mostly circumvented to enable 
the proliferation of local excise taxes. Federal laws, preempting state and local 
laws through the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause, preclude a government from 
imposing a tax on items bought using federally issued food stamps 
(Supplemental Nutritional Assistance Program, or SNAP, benefits).160 Soda 
taxes in particular have been challenged as preempted by this ban: the local tax 
will apply to federally issued benefits when shoppers purchase soda with food 
stamps—the eventuality federal laws prohibit.161 Cities have been able, 
however, to rely on an easy workaround.162 The Pennsylvania court approved 
Philadelphia’s soda tax since it was collected from the distributors of the 
beverages, not from the food stamp beneficiaries upon purchase (although, 
naturally, the tax was embodied in the beverage’s price, so the purchasers ended 
up paying at least part of it).163 Cook County similarly hoped to subvert the 
prohibition on the taxation of SNAP benefits by forcing retailers to fold the 
excise tax into the selling price of the products, instead of tacking it on at 
checkout.164 Cities can thus indirectly apply an excise tax to SNAP beneficiaries 
that federal preemption supposedly shields—as long as the tax does not appear 
as a separate charge at the register.165
                                                                                                                     
158 Id. at *7.
159 Am. Beverage Ass’n v. City of Chi., 937 N.E.2d 261, 270 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010).
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164 The plan was torpedoed by the state’s Department of Revenue which warned that 
that approach would constitute an “overcollection” from taxpayers because the higher selling 
price would then be subject to sales tax. Greg Trotter, Cook County Reversal: Soda Tax 
Won’t Apply to Food Stamp Purchases After All, CHI. TRIB. (June 9, 2017), 
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D. Summary: The Legal Incentive for Local Excise Taxation
A common thread connects all the diverse doctrinal challenges to local 
excise taxes reviewed in this Part: courts interpret the disparate relevant 
elements in constitutions, statutes, and the common law in particularly lax ways 
so as to facilitate those taxes’ adoption. Some of these moves amount to no less
than a reversal of the general rules of local government law. The convergence 
of courts’ decisions with respect to the city’s power to initiate excise taxation 
and those dealing with the state’s power to preempt such local taxation has 
generated a legal reality whereby cities are free to enact excise taxes as long as 
the state does not actively move to strike down the specific excise tax. This is 
the reverse image of the rule generally applicable when cities choose to regulate 
an activity—in which case they are prohibited from acting unless allowed by 
the state. Given this fact, and since the restrictions that apply to taxation but not 
to regulation have been largely sidestepped in the context of excise taxation, 
cities are actively incentivized to turn to excise taxation over other forms of 
regulation.
This incentive is further reinforced by the effects of several other doctrines 
that courts apply rather aggressively to more traditional manners of local 
regulation of consumer activities—but not to their taxation. Courts readily 
enforce the private law exception to home rule initiative powers, recognized in 
many states, to hold local regulations of market transactions unauthorized under 
home rule clauses.166 They often subject some forms of sales regulation, 
particularly requirements that sellers and producers warn purchasers of a
product’s effects, to rather demanding First Amendment freedom of speech 
scrutiny.167 These restrictions are rendered irrelevant when cities interfere with 
the same market activities through excise taxation rather than through other 
regulatory tools. 
In stark contrast to their approach towards other forms of local action—
including other forms of local taxation168—courts leave the regulation of local 
excise taxation to explicit and specific action by the state legislature. Courts do 
not insert themselves as the protectors of state interests. They require state 
legislators to muster the necessary political capital to blunt local action.
Both cities and states appear to have internalized this legal message 
whereby excise taxes are different as far as the city–state power relationship is 
                                                                                                                     
166 See generally Paul A. Diller, The City and the Private Right of Action, 64 STAN. L.
REV. 1109, 1111 (2012) (surveying the “private law exception” to municipal home-rule 
authority).
167 E.g., Am. Beverage Ass’n v. City of S.F., 871 F.3d 884, 897 (9th Cir. 2017), reh’g
en banc granted, 880 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 2018) (holding that a municipal ordinance requiring 
certain types of fixed advertisements for sugar-sweetened beverages to contain warnings 
about the health effects of those beverages violates First Amendment free speech rights).
168 Scharff, supra note 11, at 334 (suggesting that the law be reformed to embrace a 
“presumptive taxing authority” for localities, arguing such a move will expand local taxing 
authority in almost all states).
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concerned. In their research into cities’ regulatory actions, David Barron, Gerald 
Frug, and Rick Su found that cities are deterred from acting to address local 
concerns even when they formally have the legal power to adopt a policy.169
Uncertainty, bred of the long tradition of judicial hostility to local action, is 
sufficient to generate a local tendency towards inaction.170 Conversely, recent 
city practices suggest that local officials have few qualms when proceeding with 
excise taxation plans despite potential doubts surrounding the legality of the 
specific excise tax proposed.171 States, for their part, have moved to explicitly 
preempt specific excise taxes—perhaps realizing that courts will not block those 
local taxes on their behalf, as they do with respect to other local acts and 
taxes.172
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legally flawed, but nonetheless pushed it into law.”).
172 E.g., New York passed a law to stop New York City’s plastic bag fee. Jesse 
McKinley, Cuomo Blocks New York City Plastic Bag Law, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 14, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/14/nyregion/cuomo-blocks-new-york-city-plastic-bag-
law.html [on file with Ohio State Law Journal]. Minnesota, Maine, and Pennsylvania passed 
similar acts but they were vetoed by governors. Jared Paben, Court Ruling Throws Florida 
Bag Law in Limbo, PLASTICS RECYCLING UPDATE (May 23, 2017), https://resource-
recycling.com/plastics/2017/05/23/court-ruling-throws-florida-bag-law-limbo/ 
[https://perma.cc/BZ3M-84DT] (noting Minnesota and Maine’s vetoed legislation); Wolf 
Vetoes Bill to Outlaw Local Plastic-Bag Bans, U.S. NEWS (June 30, 2017), 
https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/pennsylvania/articles/2017-06-30/wolf-vetoes-
bill-to-outlaw-local-plastic-bag-bans [https://perma.cc/WTB8-RQ2X] (reporting 
Pennsylvania governor’s veto). In Kansas, a state statute explicitly bans all local excise taxes 
(with few enumerated exceptions). KAN. STAT. ANN. § 12-194 (2008). Twenty-one states 
explicitly prohibit local governments from imposing an excise tax on tobacco products. U.S. 
Local Tobacco Tax Authority: A 50-State Review, TOBACCO CONTROL LEGAL CONSORTIUM 
(Jan. 1, 2016), http://www.publichealthlawcenter.org/sites/default/files/resources/tclc-toba
cco-tax-authority-50-state-review-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/E6JV-L8M6]. In 2016, 
Governor Brown of California vetoed a bill that would have repealed the state’s preemptive 
law, noting that it would leave taxation to the full discretion of cities on a blanket basis. Veto 
Message from Governor Edmund G. Brown Jr. to the Members of the California State 
Assembly (May 4, 2016), https://www.gov.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/ABX2-
10_Veto_Message.pdf [https://perma.cc/8AUM-RLZT].
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The legal appeal of excise taxes also manifests itself in cities’ efforts to 
package other taxes—income taxes, business taxes,173 or impact fees174—as
excise taxes. While the most blatant efforts are not always successful,175 courts 
do not seem to police this definitional borderline too stringently.176
The legal attitude towards local excise taxation is remarkable. As scholars 
have noted, other local fiscal choices—particularly, the overall shift from taxes 
to fees—have been driven by legal restraints placed on one policy option (taxes) 
but not the other (fees).177 The case of the shift to excise taxes is even more 
extreme. The empowerment of cities to adopt this one policy tool unless 
explicitly blocked by the state undermines the typical rules of American local 
government law. Since courts much more easily find that cities lack the power 
to regulate the sale of a specific product, as opposed to the power to tax it, cities 
are forcefully pushed towards the latter option. A sequence of two Maryland 
cases provides an extreme illustration. Following the striking down of its 
development impact fee as an unpermitted use of the local regulatory power,178
Montgomery County reenacted the same levy as a development excise tax.179
The court gave its blessing to the maneuver—and to the local excise tax’s
retroactive application to ratify the imposition of the fees the court itself had 
blocked before.180
                                                                                                                     
173 For example, in Arizona, a regional transportation authority adopted a transportation 
excise tax calculated as a one-half percent levy of the gross income from the business activity 
upon every person engaging in retail to fund transportation improvements. Vangilder v. Ariz. 
Dep’t of Revenue, No. TX2017-000663, slip op. at 2–3 (Ariz. Tax Ct. July 18, 2018). The 
tax has been struck down. Id. at 3.
174 In Congregation v. Mayor of Balt., 183 A.3d 845, 869 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2018), 
the city adopted a storm water system charge based on the amount of the property’s
impervious surface. An impact fee in all but name, the court could not approve it as such—
due to its own precedence—and thus the levy had to count as a tax. See id. at 869–70. Had 
it been a property tax and not an impact fee though, the congregation—as a religious 
institution—would have been exempt. See id. at 872. The court thus agreed to characterize 
it as an excise fee—which the city could adopt and charge the congregation. Id. at 845.
175 A lower court in Washington has rejected Seattle’s income tax. Kunath v. City of 
Seattle, No. 17-2-18848-4 SEA, at 26 (Wash. Super. Ct. 2017). At court the city argued the 
tax was an excise tax. Id. at 14–16. The court was not persuaded: first, the ordinance itself 
called the tax an income tax—not an excise tax, and second, the court refused to embrace 
the argument that receiving income in Seattle or choosing to live there was a privilege (that 
as such can be subjected to an excise tax). Id. at 14, 16.
176 See, e.g., Wellington River Hollow, LLC v. King Cty., 54 P.3d 213, 221 (Wash. Ct. 
App. 2002) (declining to determine whether the County had disguised an excise tax as an 
impact fee).
177 See Laurie Reynolds, Taxes, Fees, Assessments, Dues, and the “Get What You Pay 
For” Model of Local Government, 56 FLA. L. REV. 373, 395 (2004); see also GERALD FRUG 
& DAVID BARRON, CITY BOUND: HOW STATES STIFLE URBAN INNOVATION 89 (2008) 
(discussing California).
178 See E. Diversified Props., Inc. v. Montgomery Cty., 570 A.2d 850, 855 (Md. 1990).
179 Waters Landing Ltd. P’ship v. Montgomery Cty., 650 A.2d 712, 716 (Md. 1994).
180 Id. at 716, 720.
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To the list of motivations for a local excise tax, provided in Part II.B., 
another important motivation must therefore be added: the emerging structure 
of the law.181
IV. A NORMATIVE ASSESSMENT OF THE LEGAL TREATMENT OF LOCAL 
EXCISE TAXATION
Is this legal approach sensible? Is the judicial embrace of local excise 
taxation—privileging it over many other forms of local action—justified? This 
final Part of this Article addresses that question. After presenting the rationale 
courts provide for their move and finding it somewhat lacking, it offers other 
normative justifications for the move, and concludes by chronicling two 
examples that bolster the normative argument suggested here.
A. Courts’ Rationale: The Distinction Between Regulation and Taxation
The decisions reviewed in Part III that set the legal attitude toward local 
excise taxation apart from the judicial attitude toward other local action fail to 
provide much by way of explanation. As noted, oftentimes courts content 
themselves with noting that taxation is different from regulation—and thus the 
rules applicable to the latter need not apply to the former.182 In those rare 
occasions when courts elaborate on this distinction’s grounding, they ascribe it 
to the supposed “inherent” or “essential” nature of taxation.183 The claim may 
appear striking seeing that, as a matter of formal default in American law, the 
power to tax is vested in the state legislature (which can then choose to delegate 
it to local governments).184 But the claim might be a recognition of the fact that 
no government could exist without funding. As the Supreme Court explained in 
an early, unrelated case, cities are tasked with providing some of the most 
important public services.185 Doing so requires the expenditure of money.186
Therefore, when creating cities and empowering them to execute such tasks 
                                                                                                                     
181 See also Mount Airy #1, LLC v. Pa. Dep’t of Revenue, 154 A.3d 268, 280 (Pa. 2016). 
In that case, the court denied the state the ability to vary the rate of a state excise tax in 
accordance with the location of the retailer taxed: applying one rate in one municipality and 
another in others. Id. The court in essence held that a varying excise tax must be adopted 
locally. Id.
182 See, e.g., Town of Cicero v. Fox Valley Trotting Club, Inc., 357 N.E.2d 1118, 1120 
(Ill. 1976) (“The power to regulate and power to tax are separate and distinct powers.”).
183 See supra notes 93–94, 124.
184 Murray v. City of Phila., 71 A.2d 280, 283 (Pa. 1950) (“‘[I]t is a principle universally 
declared and admitted that municipal corporations can levy no taxes, general or special, upon 
inhabitants, or their property, unless the power be plainly and unmistakably conferred.’ And 
the grant of such right is to be strictly construed, and not extended by implication.” (citations 
omitted)); JOHN MARTINEZ, 4 LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 23:1 (2018); 71 AM. JUR. 2D,
STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION § 56 (2012).
185 United States v. City of New Orleans, 98 U.S. 381, 393 (1878).
186 Id.
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states must have also—at least implicitly—granted cities the power to tax.187
“A municipality without the power of taxation would be a body without life, 
incapable of acting, and serving no useful purpose.”188
At times like ours, when cities’ financial states are extremely, and 
notoriously, dire,189 courts might be particularly accommodating to cities’
attempts at innovative fundraising. Especially since courts are well aware that 
state constitutions and legislatures have come to aggressively curtail cities’
ability to turn to, or augment, traditional modes of funding (through new 
restrictions on debt issuance and property or sales taxation)190 they might be 
more accepting of local efforts at establishing innovative fundraising measures 
not explicitly blocked by the legislature, such as excise taxes.
The problem, however, is that excise taxes are not—as Part II.B.
highlighted—solely, or even mostly, tools for raising funds.191 They can equally 
constitute regulatory measures—thereby rendering the regulation/taxation 
distinction courts draw on a formalistic artifact. Hardly any tax could function 
as purely a measure for raising revenue: the choice of what and whom to tax is 
inevitably a form of regulation.192 Any tax determines which actors will 
contribute to the government, how much, and when. That determination must 
affect individual economic and social behavior. It renders some activities more 
expensive, and thus diverts investments into other activities. This is doubly true 
with respect to excise taxes. These are taxes that single out specific goods or 
behaviors—and not other, similar ones—for special treatment. Choosing to tax 
certain products but not others—sweetened beverages but not unsweetened 
ones, plastic bags but not reusable ones—by definition involves a judgment call 
respecting products’ relative worth and interferes with relevant market actors’
future behavior. This judgment call and interference might well represent the 
original spur for the enactment of a given excise tax, as seen in Part II.B.193
Especially when analyzing excise taxes, therefore, attempts to categorically 
separate government’s function as a collector of revenue from its function as a 
regulator are—as far as sound economic thinking goes—futile. The enacting 
local officials often do not even attempt to do so themselves.194 And for the 
                                                                                                                     
187 Id.
188 Id.
189 See TRUTH IN ACCOUNTING, FINANCIAL STATE OF THE CITIES 4 (Jan. 2018), 
https://www.statedatalab.org/library/doclib/2016-Financial-State-of-the-Cities-Booklet-
FINAL-.pdf [https://perma.cc/94Q2-T2K9] (compiling data on the financial state of cities).
190 See supra notes 16–21 and accompanying text.
191 See supra Part II.B.
192 See AJAY K. MEHROTRA, MAKING THE MODERN AMERICAN FISCAL STATE: LAW,
POLITICS, AND THE RISE OF PROGRESSIVE TAXATION, 1877–1929, 30 (2013) (showing that 
the introduction of a federal income tax was not solely geared toward achieving immediate 
economic goals, but also toward laying the foundations for the new activist state).
193 See supra Part II.B.
194 See, e.g., Andy Grimm, Preckwinkle: Soda Tax Was All About Money, and the 
County Needs It, CHI. SUN-TIMES, (Oct. 4, 2017), https://chicago.suntimes.com/
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retailer or consumer, the tax renders the product more expensive—just as a 
regulation of modes of selling, of packaging, of the seller’s employment 
practices, or of the producer’s tort liability to consumers could have.
The Washington court’s claim made in the Seattle gun excise tax case—
echoing a general line of reasoning—that the tax is not a regulation since it does 
not “limit . . . the number or type of firearms and ammunition that [retailers] can 
sell”195 is hence spurious. Choosing to tax certain products is choosing to police 
certain products. A tax will probably increase the price of firearms and 
ammunition and could thus reduce sales. That is, as noted, precisely the goal of 
such an excise tax.196 Courts’ notion that excise taxes are merely tools for 
raising revenue, and, therefore, markedly different from regulation, is 
contradicted by the economics of excise taxes and the politics of their 
enactment. 
The courts’ insistence on the regulation/taxation distinction as grounding 
for a relaxed judicial attitude toward local excise taxation thus materializes as 
bafflingly formalistic. It is perhaps in line with courts’ similar tendency to “read 
[constitutional fiscal limits] narrowly, technically, and formalistically.”197
Maybe it is not unrelated to an admission made by one justice of the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court that “[o]f all the provisions of the Constitution, 
the interpretation and application of those provisions which pertain to 
taxes . . . present the most difficulties.”198 The courts’ stance toward local 
excise taxes emerges as highly unprincipled—and hardly persuasive.
B. The Normative Standing of Local Excise Taxes
The formalistic distinction between regulation and taxation on which courts 
rely provides a rather hollow justification for the overall lenient judicial 
treatment of local excise taxes. That does not mean, however, that a more robust 
normative justification cannot be found for this doctrinal attitude. Such a 
substantive justification must be sought not in some abstract form of categorical 
thinking, but rather in the normative values that serve to vindicate the embrace 
of local action. In American law and thinking, localism is associated with at 
                                                                                                                     
chicago-politics/preckwinkle-soda-tax-was-all-about-money-and-the-county-needs-it/
[https://perma.cc/F5YD-C5JB] (quoting the following statement made by Toni Preckwinkle, 
Cook County Board President, with respect to the county’s soda tax: “We chose as a revenue 
generator a sweetened beverage tax, which had been enacted around the country, both for 
the revenue and for the health benefits . . . .”). The ordinance itself cited data and evidence 
on the health impacts of consumption of sugary drinks from the World Health Organization,
the Centers for Disease Control, and the American Medical Association, among others.
COOK COUNTY, ILL., ORDINANCE 16-5931 (Nov. 10, 2016) (repealed 2017).
195 Watson v. City of Seattle, 401 P.3d 1, 7 (Wash. 2017).
196 See supra Part II.B.
197 Richard Briffault, Foreword: The Disfavored Constitution: State Fiscal Limits and 
State Constitutional Law, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 907, 910 (2003).
198 Amidon v. Kane, 279 A.2d 53, 64 (Pa. 1971).
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least two major values: democracy and efficient provision of public services.199
Both of these are indeed promoted by empowering cities to adopt excise taxes—
taxes which will therefore emerge from the analysis that follows as a rather non-
threatening form of local action. 
Local lawmaking is generally recognized as serving democracy by opening 
additional avenues for citizen participation.200 These avenues are particularly 
promising since the local level is the closest to the citizen and thus it is often 
easier to meaningfully engage the citizen in decision-making done on this 
level.201 The result, closely associated with Tocquevillian notions of American 
democracy,202 is that policies adopted on the local level—as opposed to the state 
or federal levels—better reflect residents’ political preferences, all the while 
generating an active citizenry.203
Unfortunately, enhanced participation and better political processes are not 
a given on the local level—and small-scale democracy is not without its risks. 
The assumption that residents will participate in local politics—more than they 
would in state or federal politics—often does not hold true.204 Especially on the 
local level, many policy issues strike citizens as low stakes affairs that hardly 
merit active involvement.205 Issues may not be salient enough to affect 
individuals’ voting decisions.206 Local action will not only therefore fail to 
entice participation, it might actually lead to government decisions that do not 
reflect the preferences of the inattentive majority. A highly interested minority 
group can capture the local decision-making process pressing policies dear to it 
but not beneficial to the majority of residents.207 Conversely, the embrace of 
localism could be counterproductive to democracy as it facilitates the tyranny 
of a majority.208 As James Madison warned, small scale politics, where the 
limited number of participants caps the range of competing groups and 
decreases the need to construct a diverse governing coalition, are peculiarly 
                                                                                                                     
199 See Dahl, supra note 7, at 967; Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local 
Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 422–24 (1956).
200 See ARENDT, supra note 7, at 283; see also Dahl, supra note 7, at 967 (“The city has 
at least one more advantage: it has great potentialities as a unit for educating citizens 
in . . . political socialization.”).
201 See Heather K. Gerken, Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L.
REV. 4, 7–8 (2010).
202 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 331 (Arthur Goldhammer trans., 
2004) (noting that “local institutions . . . foster a taste for liberty among the people and teach 
them the art of being free”).
203 E.g., ARENDT, supra note 7, at 114–15 (describing how American people attend town 
meetings where they were involved in the decision-making processes of local government, 
thereby sparking the revolution).
204 Nadav Shoked, The New Local, 100 VA. L. REV. 1323, 1379–81 (2014).
205 See id.
206 See id.
207 Id. at 1386–87.
208 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 61, 63–64 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
2018] CITIES TAXING NEW SINS 833
prone to absolute control by a majority group.209 With few political checks on 
its dominance, that group can proceed to adopt policies that wholly ignore the 
preferences of the minority—that may even oppress a discrete minority.210
These features and perils that generally lessen the democratic appeal of local 
decision-making are, luckily, greatly reduced when the local policy considered 
is the one relevant here. Empowering local governments in the field of excise 
taxation serves interests in democracy for two reasons. First, unlike other forms 
of regulation, taxation tends to be incredibly salient in local (and other) political 
debates and elections. Since the 1970s, taxes have been some of the most 
prominent—arguably, the most prominent—issues in American local (and 
sometimes state) politics.211 Taxes excite political passions, and thus residents 
will get involved when a local tax is contemplated or changed. Those local tax
decisions tend to become major campaign issues. Tax policies adopted through 
the local political process, therefore, are often likelier, as compared to many 
other regulatory policies, to reflect the true preferences of most residents.212
Second, excise taxation specifically is a policy field in which the risk of 
tyranny of the majority—the Madisonian concern213—is, in relative terms, 
minimalized. A city’s capacity to abuse the governmental power in adopting an 
excise tax on behalf of one group is limited through several external factors. 
Perhaps most prominently, as noted in Part III and indicated by the well-funded 
litigation initiatives challenging all local excise taxation, those affected by 
excise taxation are far from a forlorn group.214 Excise taxes are not, unlike for 
example impact fees, imposed as part of an individualized decision-making 
process that is amendable to abuse and likely to disfavor individual, non-repeat 
players who are legally unsophisticated, politically unconnected, and of limited 
economic means.215 As a tax an excise tax is a general levy applied to a broad 
group. The composition of that group further alleviates—if not fully annuls—
most concerns of abuse. Retailers, manufacturers, and major corporations—the 
                                                                                                                     
209 Id.
210 See id.
211 See Michael J. New, The Tax Revolt Turns 25, CATO INST. (May 29, 2003), 
https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/tax-revolt-turns-25
[https://perma.cc/A2MF-EW8X]. The 1970s are associated with the “tax revolt” whose 
crowning achievement was the passage of California’s Proposition 13 in 1978. See Conor 
Friedersdorf, Opinion, After 40 Years, Proposition 13’s Failures Are Evident, L.A. TIMES,
(June 4, 2018), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-friedersdorf-prop-13-
20180604-story.html [https://perma.cc/H26B-VRS5]. In the ensuing decades efforts to 
restrict local—and state—taxation through popular initiative were pursued, often 
successfully, in multiple states. New, supra note 211.
212 See Shoked, supra note 17, at 1265–66 (explaining that financial decisions—even 
those pertaining to debt, allegedly a much less salient policy tool—are salient and affect 
voter behavior).
213 See supra notes 208–210 and accompanying text.
214 See supra Part III.
215 I am grateful to Vicki Been for highlighting to me the importance of the distinction 
with impact fees.
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actors almost always prone to experience the brunt of an excise tax216—are 
somewhat unlikely to constitute a discrete and insular minority (even if the taxed 
products they peddle are consumed mostly by members of such a minority 
group). They are a well-funded, influential business group that can effectively 
guard its interests against local overreach. As such, these market actors can, 
relatively easily, conscript the state legislature to their aid against local 
action.217
Existing experience with local excise taxes bears out this prediction: many 
industries have been able to attain rapid (sometimes even preemptory) redress 
against local excise taxation of their products, in the form of explicit, and 
specific, state preemptive statutes.218 When the California legislature voted,
following intense lobbying and threats of retaliatory ballot initiative campaigns 
by the taxed industry, to preempt future local soda taxes, one senator observed 
that the beverage companies had successfully held the state “hostage.”219 The 
Senate majority leader noted that “Big soda [was] blackmailing the state 
legislature.”220
This eventuality represents the quintessential case where local power is 
relatively unthreatening to democratic values. An interest group’s dominance of 
a local government is not troublesome if its influence can be countered on 
another governmental level.221 Thus even if the local level is particularly 
hospitable to pro-excise tax interests (itself a debatable proposition) the 
likelihood that the local government will overreach in its excise taxation policies 
is exceptionally low. Other levels of government are simply too amenable to the 
influence of the opposing interests. Those interests allegedly disfavored by local 
governments do not require, therefore, judicial protection to fend off risks of 
                                                                                                                     
216 See, e.g., Williams v. City of Phila., 188 A.3d 421 (Pa. 2018) (naming “consumers, 
retailers, distributors, producers, and trade associations” as the group that brought civil action 
against Philadelphia’s soda tax).
217 See David A. Dana & Janice Nadler, Soda Taxes as a Legal and Social Movement,
13 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 84, 106–07 (2018).
218 See, e.g., id. David Dana and Janice Nadler have shown that soda tax preemption 
laws are adopted as part of political debates about those specific taxes led by the relevant 
stakeholders. Id. These are not theoretical, principled debates about the place of localism in 
American law, but rather a response on the part of legislatures to the pressure of the effected 
industries. See id.
219 Anahad O’Connor & Margot Sanger-Katz, California, of All Places, Has Banned 
Soda Taxes. How a New Industry Strategy Is Succeeding, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/27/upshot/california-banning-soda-taxes-a-new-
industry-strategy-is-stunning-some-lawmakers.html [on file with Ohio State Law Journal].
220 Id.
221 See IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 92 (1990) 
(arguing that the “problem with interest-group pluralism is not . . . that people promote their 
own interests,” but that “inequality of resources, organization, and power allows some 
interests to dominate”).
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abuse. Local majoritarian democracy should function relatively well when the 
policy considered is excise taxation.222
Like democracy, the other normative value local decision-making is set to 
promote—economic efficiency—is also well served by empowering local 
officials to adopt excise taxation; more than it often is by empowering them to 
pursue many other regulatory (or tax) policies.223 As famously explained by 
Charles Tiebout, localism advances economic efficiency by generating a 
competition over residents between many local governments.224 Once a public 
service is provided by a plethora of local governments within the state—rather 
than solely by the one state—individuals can shop with their feet for the 
service.225 They can move between localities in pursuit of the public service 
levels and pricing they desire.226 The likelihood that they obtain the service that 
best fits their preferences thereby increases. 
But this beneficial inter-local competition over residents is effective only if 
certain conditions are met. The Tiebout Model must assume, for example, that 
individuals can easily move between municipalities and have information 
respecting municipalities’ competing policies (so that residents actually, and 
meaningfully, shop with their feet);227 those policies, in turn, must not generate 
negative effects on outsiders that those shopping individuals do not 
experience—i.e., externalities.228 Such assumptions, many commentators have 
noted, are exceptionally unrealistic in the case of many local regulatory, tax, and 
service provision policies.229
The case of excise taxation, though, is one where the Tiebout Model’s
assumptions respecting mobility, knowledge, and lack of externalities, are rather 
likely—in relative terms—to be valid. Tax rates are readily discernable,230 and 
                                                                                                                     
222 I apply here to the local-state dynamic an argument similar to the one developed by 
Roderick Hills with respect to the state-federal dynamic. Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against 
Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the National Legislative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1, 28 (2007) (“[W]here a statute is ambiguous [respecting its preemptive reach], a court 
ought to interpret the preemptive force of federal statutes to burden interest groups favoring 
preemption, on the assumption that these pro-preemption groups are more capable of 
promoting a vigorous debate in Congress than their opponents.”). Similarly, the argument 
echoes Einer Elhauge’s suggestion that a when interpreting a statute, a court opt for the 
interpretation that goes against the preferences of the interest group more likely to be able to 
persuade Congress to reverse the court’s decision. Einer Elhauge, Preference-Eliciting 
Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2162, 2165–66 (2002).
223 See Tiebout, supra note 199, at 422–24.
224 Id.
225 See id. at 422.
226 See id.
227 Id. at 419.
228 Id. at 423.
229 E.g., Wallace E. Oates, On Local Finance and the Tiebout Model, 71 AM. ECON.
REV. 93, 93 (1981) (The Tiebout Model is grounded in “a set of assumptions so patently 
unrealistic as to verge on the outrageous”).
230 See generally Raj Chetty, Adam Looney & Kory Kroft, Salience and Taxation: 
Theory and Evidence, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 1145, 1158–66 (2009) (finding that an excise tax 
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retailers subjected to an excise tax can move outside city lines to avoid them. 
Even more easily, residents can similarly often adjust their shopping trips: while 
in order to avoid many regulatory policies (say school or police quality)—and 
many local taxes (say property or income taxes)—residents must actually 
relocate, to avoid an excise tax they need only shop for goods or services 
elsewhere. Since the resident need not necessarily relocate if she is to shop with 
her feet for desirable local excise tax levels, Tiebout’s mobility is not a far-
fetched assumption here; or at least not as far-fetched an assumption as it is in 
the case of many other local policies. 
The model can accordingly operate rather smoothly as competition will 
govern local government behavior.231 The dynamics are straight-forward. 
Individuals’ alteration to their shopping habits in light of the local excise tax 
pressures the local government adopting the tax. As shoppers and potentially 
retailers flee the taxing city, that government’s property and sales tax intake 
decreases. When contemplating an excise tax, therefore, cities must consider 
market pressures and thus their behavior can often generate efficient results. 
Additionally, this Tieboutian competition among municipalities, each 
employing its own excise tax, does not produce grave externalities—another 
important assumption whose presence is necessary for the Tiebout Model to 
function effectively.232 No strong state interest in uniformity is threatened by 
local excise taxes. Diverse excise and sale tax rates, unlike diverse regulations 
of business practices (for example, distinct local standards of tort liability or of 
product packaging) can hardly be said to be too onerous for businesses to 
accommodate.233 Thanks to their salience and straight forward nature, 
differences in excise tax rates between municipalities do not generate 
uncertainty. Their administration is relatively cheap, as retailers are already 
charged with collecting a sales tax—whose rate also already often varies among 
the state’s different municipalities. Tax variation among a state’s municipalities 
should not inhibit business operations and drive businesses to leave the state. 
Thus a local excise tax’s effects on other communities within the same state 
should largely be positive—as those communities stand to gain shoppers and 
businesses escaping the locality’s tax (and if those other municipalities deem 
the relevant businesses undesirable, they can adopt their own excise tax or use 
their zoning powers to divert the incoming retail uses). 
With its assumptions rather firmly satisfied in this specific context, the 
Tiebout Model can predict economic efficiency gains through the empowerment 
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of localities to adopt excise taxes. These gains might not be attainable through 
other local regulatory policies with respect to which the presence of the model’s 
assumptions is not as marked. This preference for local excise taxation over 
local regulation, suggested here based on Tieboutian analysis, is further in line 
with the more general bias many economists often express for corrective taxes 
over direct regulation of harmful activities.234
The curbs American law places on local government actions are not random. 
They are born of the normative unease with certain potential results of local 
power.235 Localism promises benefits in terms of democracy and efficiency.236
Localism also, however, poses grave risks to these and other values.237 Both the 
benefits of localism and its threats vary across different policy fields. Excise 
taxation is a policy field in which localism’s risks are, in relative terms, 
minimalized, as a city’s capacity to abuse governmental power is limited 
through several factors—political and economic. Excise taxes are probably as 
likely as any other local policy to effectively reflect residents’ preferences, and 
thus they should be embraced as a worthwhile exercise in localism.
C. Tocqueville, Tiebout, Soda, Amazon
Inarguably, the rosy normative assessment of local excise taxation just 
developed relies on certain hypotheses and predictions respecting local political 
processes and economic dynamics. Fortunately, these hypotheses and 
predictions are borne out not only by the related experiences and general 
empirical findings suggesting them, but also by recent events surrounding 
prominent local excise taxes. Specifically, the stories of Cook County’s soda tax 
and Seattle’s Amazon tax, both unfolding over the past year and mentioned in 
Part II.A., highlight the minimal need for court intervention to curtail local 
action in the excise taxation field.238
Cook County’s soda tax was adopted by the Board of Commissioners in 
November 2016239 and it took effect, having been approved by a court, on 
August 2, 2017.240 An intense political campaign followed.241 Can the Tax 
Coalition, an anti-tax group funded by the American Beverage Association, 
spent more than $3.2 million on TV and radio ads.242 Advocates also paid 
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constituents of target electoral districts within the county eleven dollars per hour 
to circulate anti-tax petitions.243 Individual county commissioners were 
lobbied—and repeatedly reminded that the following year was an election 
year.244 Coca-Cola and Pepsi donated to some pro-repeal commissioners via a 
political action committee.245 On the other side, Michael Bloomberg, the former 
New York City mayor and a pro-health policies crusader, “spent more than $10 
million on radio and ad campaigns, and an unknown amount on lobbyists and 
mailers.”246 In addition, he verbally committed to back county commissioners 
who supported the tax’s cause in the following year’s elections.247 Still, with 
public pressure mounting, several commissioners, citing the public outrage, 
switched their positions,248 and the Board voted fifteen to one to repeal the tax 
on October 11, 2017, effective December 1.249 Cook County’s soda tax lasted 
for four months.250
Seattle’s Amazon tax, imposing a $275 per-employee levy on big 
corporations to fund affordable housing, was unanimously adopted by the city 
council on May 14, 2018.251 Immediately thereafter a committee was created to 
put a referendum on the local ballot to repeal the head tax.252 Amazon gave the 
No Tax On Jobs committee $25,000, as did Starbucks, Kroger, Albertsons, and 
Vulcan, the privately owned company founded by Microsoft’s Paul Allen.253
Unions and progressive groups started a “decline to sign” campaign urging 
people not to sign the petitions.254 Before its enactment, polls indicated a strong 
majority in favor of the Amazon tax, and public opinion remained rather anti-
corporate: 69% of people approved of unions, and many had a low regard for 
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corporations.255 Nonetheless, support for the tax itself was waning: pro-tax 
groups’ internal polls showed that by this point 55% of residents objected to the 
tax.256 The concern driving down support centered on potential business 
relocations.257 Most prominent (and effective) was Amazon’s announcement
that it was halting construction on a new downtown Seattle tower.258 The 
company suggested it was considering subleasing space instead—implying that 
the company might leave Seattle if the head tax came into effect.259 The 
Building and Construction Trades Council expressed concern that the tax would 
kill construction jobs.260 Local governments neighboring the city to the south, 
namely Tacoma and Pierce County, announced a $275 tax credit per new 
employee to lure businesses from the city.261 Bellevue, Kirkland, and Redmond,
located just east of Seattle, also eagerly expected a boost to their business 
recruitment efforts.262 Seattle city council members began worrying that not 
only would they lose the tax referendum, but they would also lose their seats
come November.263 On June 12, 2018, less than a month after it had passed, the 
council voted seven to two to repeal the Amazon tax.264 Originally only 
scheduled to go into effect January 1, 2019, it would be somewhat inaccurate to 
describe Seattle’s Amazon tax as short-lived.265
The similar trajectories of the soda tax in Cook County and the Amazon tax 
in Seattle reinforce the normative assessment of local excise taxation developed 
in the preceding Section.266 In Cook County, a vibrant political debate erupted 
surrounding the local excise tax, with money pouring from both sides and with 
individual residents making their voices heard even before polling stations 
opened.267 In Seattle, the local excise tax stimulated not only local political 
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action268 but also, and perhaps more crucially, inter-local competition.269
Neighboring local governments attempted to position themselves to 
accommodate actors that were pondering—or purporting to ponder—a move in 
reaction to the city’s policy.270 Seattle itself was keenly aware of those actors’
maneuvers and adjusted its policies in accordance.271
Opinions can of course differ on the social merits of the end result of the 
struggles surrounding Cook County’s soda tax and Seattle’s Amazon tax. Some 
surely lament the taxes’ demise. But the story of the two ill-fated taxes shows 
that local political and economic dynamics effectively police local excise 
taxation. Those burdened by local excise taxation are not incapable of protecting 
their position through the democratic process or the market; if anything, local 
excise tax supporters are often at a disadvantage as they might find themselves 
arrayed against powerful business interests. No need thus normally exists to 
extend court protection against local excise taxation. The judicial reluctance to 
curb local action in the domain of excise taxation—incoherent in its stated 
justifications—emerges as normatively sound from this contemplation of 
contemporary examples.
V. CONCLUSION
Local excise taxation offers great insights into the evolving state–local 
relationship in American law. These taxes represent a rather rare occasion where 
local power is rising in meaningful ways. Cities are increasingly, almost 
incessantly, adopting excise taxes.272 Courts facilitate this move by applying to 
local excise taxation a rule that is the reverse of the normal rule respecting local 
action: cities can adopt these taxes, as long as the state does not specifically opt 
to block them. Though this rule is often grounded in a mostly senseless 
formalistic distinction between taxation and regulation, it is normatively 
desirable. Local excise taxes promote the promise of localism whilst limiting 
localism’s threat. 
This argument developed in this Article on behalf of local excise taxes is an 
argument in support of localism—not an argument in support of the specific 
excise taxes growing prevalent over the past few years, nor even necessarily an 
argument in support of the benefits of excise taxation as a policy tool. The 
debate over the worth of the individual excise taxes cities have recently 
adopted—soda taxes, plastic bag taxes, etc.—hinges, for many, on the firmness 
of the scientific evidence respecting the dangers posed by the taxed products or 
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activities.273 This Article has no pretenses of engaging such debates; and those 
debates, in turn, have no bearing on this Article. This Article’s argument for 
local decision-making respecting the adoption of an excise tax is as valid when 
the relevant tax is based on undisputed science—as in the case of a cigarette 
tax—as when it is based on no science at all—as in the case of a hypothetical 
condom tax. 
The debate over the desirability of excise taxation as a general policy tool, 
for its part, focuses on questions touching upon, for example, excise taxes’
incidence (i.e., which group bears excise taxes’ burden) and their often 
regressive effects.274 The answers economists provide to these questions should, 
inarguably, impact policymaking and legal attitudes towards excise taxes. For 
the purposes of this Article they are, however, of limited relevance—given the
specific question the Article tackled. The Article asked not whether excise taxes 
should be adopted, but rather whether they should be adopted by local, as 
opposed to solely state, governments.
The answer to that question is that courts should not—and do not—on their 
own initiative block local governments, because they are local governments, 
from adopting excise taxes. Of course, some local excise taxes should still be 
struck down without awaiting specific preemptive action by the state legislature. 
Local excise taxes can target historically disempowered groups (consider the 
“tampon tax”275). In addition, “an unlimited power to tax involves, necessarily, 
a power to destroy,”276 and a local excise tax could through an exceptionally 
high rate bar behaviors the state has explicitly sought to promote (for instance, 
marijuana dispensaries could be banished from a city through exorbitant excise 
taxation).277 But other than in such exceptional cases, courts are right to demand 
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that the state act explicitly if it seeks to overcome a local excise tax. The judicial 
endorsement of local excise taxation—no matter how shaky its doctrinal 
grounding and stated reasoning—is a laudable embrace of localism.
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